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Abstract 
 
We investigate the view that de facto labor market conditions are important in 
evaluating the effects of labor institutions in developing countries where enactment 
does not necessarily imply enforcement. Using India as a case study we empirically 
investigate the effects of labor markets on the organized manufacturing sector from 
1970 to 1997. Recognizing that the state can intervene in the outcome of labor disputes 
we construct a measure to proxy the degree of the state legislature’s prejudice towards 
pro-worker causes. We argue that leftist and communist political parties can interfere 
in the resolution of disputes in favor of workers through conciliation, arbitration, and 
the adjudication machinery, and so we use the share of seats won by left parties as a 
proxy for how supportive the state legislature is towards workers’ concerns. Our 
findings suggest that manufacturing output in the formal sector reduces with a higher 
presence of the left in the state legislature, and this effect is greater in states enacting 
pro-worker laws. In addition we also find that the intensity of worker usage is adjusted 
downwards, and factory registration declines with a greater presence of the left and is 
also intensified when states amending laws favoring workers. A more pro-worker state 
legislature itself however, does not significantly affect employment, worker 
productivity, fixed capital stock, and investment. Our results are most robust from 1980 
onwards as it coincides with the changes in the Indian polity. We get some indication 
that the insignificance of labor market conditions on employment and wages is 
possibly due to the left parties in West Bengal functioning differently than parties in 
other states. In addition, disaggregate data confirms our main findings and reveals that 
the average factory size reduces in labor intensive sectors with left-leaning parties, and 
this effect is worse in states with pro-worker labor laws. 
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1. Introduction 
In a period spanning half a century, India’s manufacturing sector has lagged behind the 
Asian Tigers by contributing on average only 16 percent of GDP over the past 30 years. 
Formal manufacturing output increased from 51 percent in 1958 to 65 percent in 1992 as 
a share of total manufacturing output, but still contributes to only 10 percent of total net 
state domestic product. The fastest growing Indian states have experienced a constant or 
declining share of net state domestic product going to manufacturing output with an 
increasing share going towards services (Kochhar et al, 2006). Numerous studies have 
argued that labor regulation is a primary determinant of the observed trends: an 
impediment to growth and the success of reforms (Sachs et al, 2000).  
 
Attributing low economic performance to labor institutions is not a novel inquest. 
Proponents of deregulating labor markets claim that interventions misallocate resources 
and create distortions, thereby working against the initial objective of protecting workers 
and increasing worker welfare. Minimum wages, job security regulations, and social 
security increase inequality by shifting labor from the formal sector – as demand for labor 
in formal sector reduces with increasing labor costs arising from hiring/firing costs 
(Besley and Burgess, 2004) or unions bargaining for higher wages (Freeman 2008) – to 
the informal sector (World Bank, 1990). The literature terms this as the relative price 
effect. Interventions can also lead to the expropriation effect, where increasing the 
bargaining power of workers leads them to seize part of employers’ sunk investments 
(Besley and Burgess, 2004); or the “rigidity effect” (Ahsan and Pagés, forthcoming), 
where wage and employment flexibility is reduced.  
 
While the debate for the developed world has been between ‘distornionists’– who are 
against intervention, and ‘institutionists’– who in favor of intervention argue that 
institutions can bring about Pareto improvements under adverse market conditions, the 
increasingly important issue in developing countries is on the topic between the de jure 
labor laws and implementation in practice.1 Some studies rank countries based on the 
                                               
1 Terms in single quotes as coined by Freeman (1993). 
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International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions ratified (Botero et al, 2004; Forteza 
and Rama, 2002) but observers argue that often developing countries do not implement 
ILO codes or conventions (Freeman 2000), they have “limited enforcement capabilities” 
(Forteza and Rama, 2002) arising due to lack of personnel and corruption, or firms find 
ways to avoid restrictive labor laws (Almeida and Carneiro, 2005).  
 
This paper adds to the empirical literature on the effects of labor regulation, and to a 
lesser extent investment climate surveys (see Dollor et al., 2002; Goswami et al, 2002; 
and Indicus Analytics, 2004), on economic outcome. It contributes to the existing 
literature on statutory labor laws (see Besley and Burgess, 2004; Bhalotra, 1998; Botero 
et al., 2004; Roy, 2004; and Fallon and Lucas, 1993) by recognizing that de facto 
implementation of labor laws is important in the case of India and in a broader sense for 
developing countries. Based on ILO conventions ratified, India ranks the highest in the 
south Asia region2 but comes across as being most flexible in practice (Forteza and Rama, 
2002). Anant et al (2006) argue that labor regulation depends on the “culture of 
governance” and “reading off directly from legal statutes to measure rigidness could be 
misleading” as there are “intermediate factors” transforming enactment to enforcement 
that could invalidate the intention of the statutory law. This paper exploits the setup of the 
state machinery in resolving disputes. Conciliation proceedings are not free from political 
interference (Saini, 1997). State governments can intervene to come to an understanding 
between workers and employers, and in the event of failure can refer for adjudication in 
labor courts and tribunals (Ramaswamy 1985). The state government therefore enjoys 
considerable power as it can steer a dispute resolution towards a party or through inaction 
by ignoring claims and awards. 
 
We argue that communist and leftist parties in the state legislature are known to have a 
pro-worker intervention stance in comparison to parties that are either unconcerned with 
labor issues or have liberal views on economic policies. For instance, in 2005 the 
Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) called a national 
strike involving over 60 million workers in protest to the liberal doctrines of the central 
                                               
2 India has ratified 39 of the 184 ILO Conventions (Planning Commission, 2001a). 
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government. The effects of the strike were severely felt as stated by the President of the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry: 
 
“The strike has paralyzed the economic and industrial activities all over 
the country in a substantial manner, the losses of which are difficult to be 
measured now.”3 
 
We use such factual events to justify that a greater power of the left in the state 
legislature is more likely move industrial disputes and conflict of interest between 
employers and workers in favor of the latter. To do this we create a measure of the share 
of seats won by left parties in the Legislative Assembles elections. A greater victory for 
the left would imply more sympathy from the legislature towards workers’ causes. We 
use this indicator as a proxy for implementation of labor laws. Intuitively the 
“effectiveness” of the labor laws is then determined by the interaction of statutory labor 
laws with implementation of the laws. Using this strategy we can explain how much of 
manufacturing performance is explained by de jure labor laws. Specifically, we explore if 
variations in party presence in the state legislature can alter the efficacy of labor practices 
in explaining manufacturing performance. We ask: Is it the case that political parties in 
the state legislature with an orientation towards the left have an adverse effect on 
manufacturing performance in states with pro-worker laws? How does this contrast with 
other political parties oriented to the center or to the right? 
 
Our main finding is that registered manufacturing output reduces with a higher share of 
seats held by left parties in the state legislature, and this effect is greater in states that 
enact laws favoring workers. In addition, we also find the number of factories and 
intensity of usage of workers in the formal manufacturing sector to reduce in states that 
have amended pro-worker laws with a larger share of seats in the state legislature. 
However, there is little to no evidence of the effects on employment, capital stock, and 
investment. We conduct a series of robustness tests which includes singling out outlier 
                                               
3  Source: World Socialist, 4 October 2005, Web Site: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/oct2005/indi-
o04.shtml 
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states and outlier observations, as well as using two alternate measures to proxy for 
enforcement of labor laws. With an average of 67 percent seats held by the left and 
having enacted the maximum number of pro-worker amendments, West Bengal stands 
out as an outlier state. On excluding West Bengal from our sample we still find 
significance results from 1980 onwards. There is some indication that the weak evidence 
on the effects on employment arises due to the left in West Bengal. The left parties in 
West Bengal seem have a negative impact on employment but are able to raise worker’s 
wages contrary to the left in other states. This is not surprising given that the communist 
party in the state is known to implement labor laws more acutely than most of its 
compatriots elsewhere.  
 
We also examine data at the state-industry level to address issues of specialization of 
technology biasing our results. We find strong evidence that pro-worker deposition of the 
Legislative Assemblies reduces production in the registered manufacturing sector even 
further in states enacting labor laws to protect workers. Incorporating industry 
characteristics reveals that factory size in labor intensive sectors are affected more in 
states with pro-worker labor laws when there is a large presence of left parties in the state 
legislature. Consolidating the results we find that our proxy for implementation of labor 
laws best explains the link between de jure laws and manufacturing performance for the 
key output indicator, namely registered manufacturing output. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces labor laws in 
India and reviews pertinent literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 specifies the 
model, discusses the results, and addresses issues of linearity and robustness. Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. Labor Regulation and Manufacturing 
Article 246 of the Indian Constitution places labor and labor welfare on the Concurrent 
List, whereby both the central government and states governments have legislative power 
concerning labor issues. Acts at the center apply to the entire nation while state acts have 
a smaller scope and apply to the state concerned. Indian law is largely based on common 
law as was introduced during the British Raj which evolved to prevent capitalist 
exploitation of workers. Civil law systems incorporate a comprehensive set of legal rules 
that are usually changeable only through legislation thereby rendering them inflexible. 
Common law systems instead rely on the judicial system to amend laws based on specific 
cases which make them more adaptable to current conditions. As a result legal theory 
predicts that common law countries regulate labor markets less than civil law countries 
(Botero, 2004). However in the case of India, the concurrent framework has led to a 
plethora of labor laws with nearly 50 central and over 200 state laws. 13 central laws are 
each enforced solely by the central government and state governments, the remaining 
being enforced jointly by the two. Table 1 lists the major central labor laws related to the 
industrial workers categorized by welfare, social security, industrial disputes, working 
conditions and other laws. Most laws apply to the organized sector, which as of 1999 
employs on average only 7.1 percent of the total workforce but contributes to nearly 40 
percent of net domestic product. 4 
 
The four contentious labor laws concerning rigidity in the formal sector are the Trade 
Union Act, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, the Contract Labor 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, and Industrial Disputes Act. Out of these the empirical 
literature has mainly focused on the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, which 
extends to all industrial workers but excludes managerial and administrative employees 
as they earn more than a specified statutory amount and are considered to hold 
supervisory positions. 5  The IDA describes the procedures for investigation and 
                                               
4 Data collected by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in the National Sample Survey (NSS) 
55th round (1999) and reported by Government of India, Ministry of Labor, Web Site: http://labour.nic.in/ 
5  We ignore minimum wage rates in our study as they apply mostly to the informal sector and are 
considered ineffective. Fallon (1987) states minimum wage rates are well below unskilled wages in large 
establishments and at or 20 percent below wages in smaller establishments. Furthermore, a study by ILO 
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settlements of industrial disputes and the situations in which layoffs, retrenchment and 
closure can occur and specifies the level of compensation. In particular, section 25 of 
chapters V and V-B has been most controversial. Chapter V-B was inserted in the Act in 
1976 by the center to make prior approval of the appropriate government mandatory in 
the case of layoffs, retrenchment and closure in industrial establishments employing more 
than 300 workers. In 1982 another central amendment extended chapter V-B to 
establishments employing at least 100 workers.6 Although the IDA was instituted by the 
central (federal) government, state governments are allowed to make amendments as they 
see fit. 
 
The earlier literature has examined the impact of employment protection amendments to 
the IDA by the federal government, the findings for which call for greater flexibility in 
labor markets. Fallon and Lucas (1993) study 64 manufacturing industries in India from 
1959 to 1981 and find a reduction in demand for workers but with no effect on wages or 
slowing down in adjustment of number of employees following the amendment. 
Industries with large privately owned factories that had fewer union members and with 
more extensive coverage of legislation had the largest reduction in Labor demand, 17.5% 
on average, as a result of the 1976 amendment of chapter V-B to the IDA.  Bhalotra 
(1998) however, contends the results of Fallon and Lucas by highlighting the statistically 
low significance of the estimates and argues that one should expect the speed of 
adjustment of employment to shocks to be slower on enacting job protection laws. 
Bhalotra also states that job protection should lower hiring and firing rates, but the direct 
impact on employment has no theoretical base and is ambiguous as seen in OECD 
countries (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). Roy (2002) studies the impact of both the 
IDA amendments (1976 and 1982) and finds accession rates to be higher than separation 
rates pre-1976, a period of employment growth, while hiring rates declined slower than 
separation rates from 1976 to 1983, thereby implying that the amendments reduced labor 
market flexibility despite having a small impact on employment. In contrast Roy’s (2004) 
                                                                                                                                            
(1996) found that minimum wages rates to be lower in real terms after periodic increments when compared 
to rates before adjustment. 
6See Anant et. al. (2006) pg 244-245 for a summary of the major IDA amendments made by the center.  
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dynamic inter-related factor demand functions reveal a diminished impact of the 
amendments.  
 
The most influential7 analysis of labor regulation was conducted by examining the effects 
of state amendments of the IDA in explaining heterogeneity of manufacturing output in 
the organized sector across Indian states. Constructing a labor regulation index, Besley 
and Burgess (2004) find that labor regulation has a negative impact on registered 
manufacturing output. States with higher pro-worker legislation have no effect on wages 
but experience lower levels of employment. Fixed capital and worker productivity are 
also hindered by labor regulation in support of the expropriation effect. Disaggregate 
evidence at the industry-state level reconfirm their findings as it eradicates concerns that 
patterns of specialization or technological change are driving the negative correlation 
between labor regulation and manufacturing performance. Lastly, they find urban poverty 
to increase with greater pro-worker regulation of labor.8  
 
Ahsan and Pagés (forthcoming) improve on the Besley-Burgess study by modifying the 
regulatory index to make the study compatible with other literature concerning different 
labor laws: They break down the Besley-Burgess regulatory index into a disputes 
resolution index and employment protection law index. Their analysis shows both types 
of legislations to reduce registered manufacturing output. The effects on investment, 
productivity, and employment are similar to Besley and Burgess (2004) with the 
exception that employment protection laws improve workers wages but wages reduce 
when dispute resolution is made more costly. This provides an explanation for the 
statistically low significance of labor regulation on wages in the Besley-Burgess study as 
employment protection laws and dispute resolution laws were combined into a single 
index.  
 
Several studies adopt the Besley and Burgess (2004) regulatory index and institutional 
classification of states to study the consequences of economic reforms and labor 
regulation on outcomes. Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2007) find a positive impact of 
                                               
7 in terms of official/government opinion and as referred to in Ministry of Finance (2006).     
8 see Besley, Burgess, and Esteve-Volart (2007) for a literature review on poverty and growth in India. 
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trade liberalization on the elasticity of labor demand. Using dummy variables they 
collapse Besley and Burgess’s (2004) institutional classification into states with flexible 
and inflexible laws, but contrary to the Besley-Burgess coding they re-classify the states 
of Gujarat and Maharashtra as flexible and Kerala as inflexible in labor laws based on the 
investment climate (see Goswami et al, 2002). In response to lower trade protection they 
find that labor demand elasticities increase more in states with flexible labor institutions 
than in states with inflexible labor institutions.  Aghion et al (forthcoming) instead use 
annual values of the regulatory measure of Besley and Burgess (2004) to examine the 
interaction between product market and labor market regulations. They find support for 
their theory that delicensed industries and tariff reductions in pro-employer states 
benefited more than pro-workers states. Topalova (2004) finds that lower tariff rates 
affects growth of firms’ total factor productivity independently of labor regulation 
identified by pro-worker and pro-employer state dummies. Classifying states by the 
investment climate, as well as using other state level characteristics, doesn’t seem to 
influence the effect of trade liberalization on firm productivity. Topalova provides no 
explanation for these results. On the contrary Topalova (2005) uses Hasan, Mitra and 
Ramaswamy (2007) classification of states and finds that rigidities in the labor market 
impedes reallocation of factors across sectors under trade liberalization and worsens 
income inequality and poverty. Aside from studying the manufacturing sector, the 
Besley-Burgess index has also been made use of in studying growth patterns and income 
inequality. 9  
 
The credibility of the Besley-Burgess measure as an appropriate proxy for labor market 
conditions is questioned by a number of Indian economists but the counter evidence is 
limited. In two survey studies Sharma and Sasikumar (1996) and Deshpande et al (2004) 
find a lack support for the view that labor laws constrained employment growth and fixed 
capital investment in manufacturing firms. Bhattacharjea (2006) provides a critical 
review of methodology adopted and interpretation of the IDA amendments. Most 
importantly he raises concerns about the interpretation and coding of specific 
                                               
9 Topalova (2008) studies income inequality to find that the poor lose out in consumption growth in states 
with pro-worker laws. 
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amendments, most of which should not be assigned pro-worker or pro-employer. In 
section 3.2.1 we take this into account and recode amendments following Ahsan and 
Pagés (forthcoming) and make additional changes where necessary. Second, various 
studies document a decline in bargaining power of workers during liberalization, in spite 
of no changes in labor laws. The number of person-days lost to strikes and lockouts 
(Figure 1) and the share of income going to workers (Figure 2) has undoubtedly fallen 
during this period. Nagaraj (2004) also shows that the share of earnings going to 
supervisors has increased relative to workers. Nevertheless, India loses more workdays 
annually to strikes and lockouts than any other country (Bhattacherjee, 2001). 
Furthermore, while we do not contest the recent patters, the arguments are all presented at 
the aggregate level. Workers may have lost out in wages, but the relative loss may have 
been less in states with a rigid labor market compared to states with freer labor markets. 
In addition the time fixed effects in the panel studies conducted should capture the 
nationwide trend. We apply the same reasoning to the documented loss in employment 
experience post-1990 which occurred due to a variety of reasons such as domestic and 
international competition, restructuring or firms, and introduction of the voluntary 
retirement schemes (VRS) by the national renewal fund (NRF). 
 
Critics of the Besley and Burgess (2004) study also argue that contract employment has 
risen since the 1980s. Deshpande et al. (2004) cite that larger firms have used more 
contract employment. However, while the share of temporary workers has increased, it is 
unclear whether the increase is due to greater enforcement of the IDA, lax enforcement of 
the Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition) Act, or both. In any case firms may have 
found a way to circumvent the industrial laws which otherwise would not have been 
necessary if the laws were not implemented to begin with or contract employment is less 
costly even in the presence of pro-employer laws. In fact Ahsan and Pagés (forthcoming) 
find little evidence that contract employment has eased the negative impact of statutory 
laws on output and find even weaker evidence in the case of employment. Another issue 
raised is the classification of Gujarat and Maharashtra as pro-worker states and Kerala as 
a pro-employer state when in fact these states are known to possess quite the opposite 
labor market conditions. Our proxy for state bias towards pro-worker causes is in line 
 10 
with this but we do not modify the regulatory index itself as it strictly tracks amendments 
made to the IDA. 
  
Outside the Indian experience, there is extensive literature covering labor market 
institutions and outcomes. Freeman (2000) summarizes the literature on developed 
countries and concludes that overall institutions affect distributional outcomes but have 
less convincing effects on efficiency.10 In contrast recent studies on developing countries 
point towards labor regulations causing inefficiency and creating a larger informal sector.  
In an analysis of firm-level and city level data for Brazil, Almeida and Carneiro (2005) 
find that stricter enforcement of labor laws diminishes firms’ productivity, profitability, 
and use of labor as implementation of laws reduces access to the informal labor market. 
Heckman and Pagés (2003) conduct a cross-country study of Latin American and 
Caribbean labor markets and find that although job security regulations show 
inconclusive results on the level of employment at the aggregate level across countries, 
they have a large and negative effect on employment at disaggregate level.11 Furthermore, 
the dispersion reducing effects of labor union in developed countries has no support in 
the case of Latin American countries. The consensus that labor market institutions have 
“modest hard-to-uncover effects on efficiency” (Freeman 2000) may not apply to 
developing countries.  
 
Recent cross-country studies involving both developing and developed countries call for 
deregulation of labor markets. Countries with heavier regulation for firm entry do not 
provide better quality of private or public goods (Djankov et al, 2002). Using plant-level 
data, Micco and Pagés (2007) show that employment protection impedes growth of 
highly volatile sectors thereby reducing job turnover, firm entry and productivity. Forteza 
                                               
10 for cross-sectional results see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell (1997) and Nickell and Layard 
(2000). 
11 This is a classic case where micro data is proven to be useful when cross-country macro time series 
evidence is inconclusive. Freeman (2005) also suggests using micro data instead of conducting additional 
cross-country studies. The macro-level cross-country analysis can yield fickle results when only a few 
countries or short time series data is available. For instance, the conclusions in Heckman and Pagés (2003) 
differed significantly from an earlier version of their paper in 2000 after including Chile in their cross-
section of countries. Freeman (2005) also mentions the changing views of the OECD countries as seen in 
various publications of Employment Outlook (1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2002, and 2004) which now accept 
the view that the evidence is “fragile”.     
 11 
and Rama (2002) analyze data from 119 countries and find nations with rigid labor 
markets to have undergone deeper recessions before adjustment and slower recovery after 
economic reforms. Botero et al. (2004) categorize labor laws as employment laws, 
industrial (collective) relations laws and social security laws for 85 countries and find 
that heavier regulation of labor results in lower labor force participation and higher 
unemployment, especially for the young. Using a panel of 60 countries, Caballero et al. 
(2006) find that job security regulation lowers the speed of adjustment of employment 
and the creative-destruction process. Most relevant to the current discussion from these 
studies is the acknowledgement that the regulatory environment depends on the level of 
enforcement, for which Micco and Pagés (2007) measure by the “rule of law” (survey 
data from Kauffman et al, 2003), Caballero et al. (2006) measure using rule of law and 
government efficiency (survey data from Kauffman et al, 1999), and Botero et al (2004) 
measure using effectiveness of legislature (using data from Djankov et al., 2002).  
 12 
3. Data 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. For most 
of the analysis the period of study ranges from 1970 to 1997. We restrict our data set to 
16 out of 28 major States. Of the missing states, data for the concerned outcome variables 
were not recorded for the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim. 
The states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand were carved out of Madhya 
Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh in 2000. The remaining five states – Goa, Himachal 
Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Tripura – are not used due to limitations in 
constructing appropriate price indices and population count compatible to that used for 
the 16 major states in this study. A majority of earlier studies also make use of the 16 
states. The following subsections discuss the source of the outcome variables, our 
explanatory variables, and the rationale for using controls made available to us.  
 
3.1. Outcome Variables 
All the outcome variables used (except for the non-manufacturing sector related output) 
are for the registered manufacturing sector. The Factories Act, 1948, defines registered 
establishments – factories or plants – as those that employ 10 or more employees and use 
electric power, or 20 or more employees without the use of power. All enterprises 
covered by the Act form the formal, registered, or organized manufacturing sector. The 
unorganized sector embodies all remaining enterprises. We use state-level factory data on 
output, employment, wages, efficiency, and investment for registered manufacturing 
from the Annual Survey of Industries. Using these variables one can study the effects of 
labor regulation on manufacturing output, workers employed, plant establishment, 
productivity, and capital accumulation. Data collected is from the factory sector, which 
consists of the census sector and the sample sector. Factories with 50 or more workers 
and employing power or 100 or more with power are covered in the census sector. All 
remaining factories with at least 10 workers with power, or 20 workers without power, 
come under the sample sector. The 16 states covered in this study account for over 95 
percent of total registered manufacturing output and employment for each year. These 
states also comprise the bulk of the Indian population (also 95 percent). 
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In addition we use data at the state-industry level collected from the Annual Survey of 
Industries. The data is recorded at the two digit NIC level. We leave out industries for 
which data is recorded sparsely leaving us with 21 industries. The states of Jammu & 
Kashmir and Kerala have 17 and 19 industries, Haryana and Rajasthan have 20 industries 
each, and the remaining states have data for 21 industries. The time period spans only 
1979 to 1997 giving us an average of 19 observations for each industry for each of the 16 
states.  
 
3.2. Explanatory Variables 
3.2.1. De jure measure of labor regulation 
Our measure for Labor regulation across Indian states is taken from Besley and Burgess 
(2004) and refers to the state amendments to the IDA. In total 113 state amendments to 
the IDA were studied and coded as pro-worker, pro-employer, and neutral depending on 
the expected impact on the party’s bargaining power. A pro-worker amendment is given a 
score of +1, a pro-employer amendment gets a score of -1, and an amendment with no 
clear impact on the bargaining power of workers or employers is assigned 0. For years in 
which more than one amendment is passed, the net score of amendments is computed but 
brought down to +1, -1 or 0 to indicate the net impact on the bargaining power. For 
instance, the state of Andhra Pradesh made 8 amendments to the IDA in 1987 with two 
pro-employer amendments and 6 pro-worker amendments yielding a net score of 4. Since 
the net impact is pro-worker, the state gets a score of +1 for the year. The scores for each 
state are cumulated over time to construct the regulatory Index. 
 
In response to the critique by Bhattacharjea (2006) on the interpretation and miscoding of 
specific amendments, we adopt the list of amendments re-coded by Ahsan and Pagés 
(forthcoming). For instance, 1968 Andhra Pradesh amendment is described in the online 
data appendix of the Besley and Burgess study as: 
  
Any services in hospitals or dispensaries are classified as a public utility. 
Public utilities are more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and the 
government has greater power to refer industrial disputes in public utilities 
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service to the appropriate court. In the central act these services are not 
classified as public utilities. 
 
Bhattacharjea argues that services in hospitals and dispensaries are irrelevant for 
manufacturing and should not be assigned a pro-worker or pro-employer score. Appendix 
D lists 10 amendments that we re-code to modify our regulatory measure. We incorporate 
7 changes as listed in Ahsan and Pagés (forthcoming) and make additional changes to the 
Besley and Burgess regulatory index as suggested by Bhattacharjea. Note that we use the 
index from the period from 1970 and don’t use it beyond 1997 unlike other studies and 
avoid a potential problem of inappropriate use of the index as there were no amendments 
made until 2002. We also counter those who have reservations of using the index as a 
measure of de jure laws by claiming that it is still able to pick up some of the variation in 
manufacturing performance; it therefore remains a useful measure. 
 
3.2.2. Left presence in Legislative Assemblies 
The political science literature has typically adopted two approaches to examine the 
effects of political parties on economic policy and government performance (Chhibber 
and Nooruddin, 2004). The first approach studies governments steering economic policy 
and social programs to gain victory at elections. This is congruent to political power 
theories in the context of labor regulation where political parties in power design 
institutions such as unions to benefit themselves (Botero, 2004). The second line of 
literature centers on the ideology of ruling political parties in explaining the different 
policy actions of the government. While the political science literature links the effects of 
political ideology to government performance in terms of state expenditure, welfare 
programs, and delivery of public goods, our interest is in examining the interaction 
between labor institutions and the influence of political institutions on the labor market 
environment.  
 
To link state-level labor institutions and political institutions we need to consider the 
composition of state legislatures, also known as the Vidhan Sabhas. We categorized all 
parties that have won seats in the state legislature during any election year in the 16 states 
(see Appendix A). Parties are categorized at two levels: i) political ideology, and ii) 
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political orientation. A party’s political ideology is a characteristic or identity usually 
determined at the founding of the party. For instance, the Communist Party of India (CPI) 
dates back to 1920 with links to the international communist movements, in particular the 
Communist Party of Soviet Union (Mehra, 2003). The Communist Party of India - 
Marxist (CPM), which split from the CPI in 1964, declares that it “adheres to its aim of 
building socialism and communism” in India.12 The Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) 
is more radical than the CPI and CPM but does not take up arms unlike the Communist 
Party of Indian – Marxists Leninist (CPI (ML)) which guides its principles based on 
“Marxism-Leninism” and relies on “organised class struggle and mass action” to achieve 
its goals and objectives.13 We classify these four parties as Communist. 14 Similarly all 
other parties with a regional or state specific presence (i.e. parties that do not hold office 
across several states) that have a communist or socialist leaning are labeled with a Leftist 
political ideology. These parties also include democratic socialist parties which represent 
certain population groups many of whom are from the bottom of the income distribution. 
Other political ideologies include Hindutva (parties promoting Hinduism), Liberalist, 
Socialist (early socialist parties functioning differently from the communist parties), and 
Islamist. A categorization that deserves mention here is the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). 
BSP is a Dalit socialist party and one would assume it should be placed under the 
Socialist political ideology. We choose not to do so for two reasons. First, the Socialist 
ideology is for early parties active during the first few elections post-independence and 
the 1970s while the BSP was established in 1984. Second, in the state of Uttar Pradesh 
where the BSP has gained considerable power, it has had to align itself with the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) despite the ideological differences (Jaffrelot, 1998) and hence classify 
it under Hindutva.15 
 
In cases where the political ideology isn’t clear we categorize parties by major groupings. 
There are three major groupings: Congress, Janata, and Regional. The Indian National 
Congress (INC) forms the main party in the Congress group. Other parties in the congress 
                                               
12 CPM, Programme adopted at the Seventh Congress, Calcutta, October 31 to November 7, 1964 and 
updated by the Spcial Conference, Thiruvananthapuram, October 20-23, 2000, Section 6.2 
13 RSP, Constitution, 1940, Section 1.3  
14 For differences between the four parties see Ray (1972) 
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group are splinter parties or major divisions that occurred over time. Some parties may 
have also gone through name changes and may appear repetitive. For instance the INC 
was renamed INC (I) under Indira Gandhi’s leadership. The Janata group lists parties that 
formed and split from the Janata Party that contested and won the 1977 general elections 
in opposition to the ruling Congress. Some of these parties later formed the Janata Dal 
and so come under the Janata category. Regional parties are those which participate in 
constituencies within a state, or constituencies falling in neighboring states representing 
particular groups based on culture, religion, etc. Some prominent regional parties are the 
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK) and Dravida Munnetra 
Kazagham (DMK) in Tamil Nadu, Akali Dal in Punjab, and Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 
in Andhra Pradesh, to name a few.  
 
From the first general elections to 2004 we have 632 parties that contested Legislative 
Assembly elections in 16 states, of which 180 parties have won seats. Figure 3 shows 
how the share of seats won in the state legislature has varied over time for our political 
ideology and major groups. In most states we find a high proportion of seats held by 
Congress from independence to the 1970s which marked a period of Congress dominance 
similar to national level politics or the Lok Sabha elections. From the 1977 elections 
onwards we see larger discrepancies across states with oscillations - or dominance in 
some cases - between Congress and the other groups like regional, Janata, BJP, and 
communist parties.  
 
Proceeding with our taxonomy we abstract one level higher and cluster the political 
ideologies and major groups into political orientation. The political orientation suggests 
the bias that parties have towards workers. We argue that the bias can affect dispute 
outcomes because of the design of the resolution machinery. The Central Industrial 
Relations Machinery (CIRM) is charged with the duty of settlement of industrial disputes 
and enforcement of other labor laws in the central sphere for which the central 
government is the appropriate government. State governments have their own labor 
departments overlooking enforcement of labor laws. In the event of a dispute employers 
and workers engage in compulsory or voluntary conciliation. Conciliation is involvement 
 17 
of a third party which is mostly conciliation officers and to a lesser extent conciliation 
boards. Conciliation officers come in two forms: professional conciliators or outsiders. 
The professional conciliators are appointed by the State, while outsiders are usually 
political figures such as ministers, members of the Legislative Assemblies, labor 
commissioners, etc. (Ratnam, 2003). While conciliators help the parties involved to 
develop their own proposed solutions, outsiders tend to act as mediators and arbitrators 
thereby implying that the conciliation process is not autonomous and independent from 
outside influence. In the case of failure of conciliation the state government or officers 
can refer the case for adjudication. Adjudication involves labor courts and tribunals 
where the former are mostly involved with individual worker disputes and the latter are 
involved with collective disputes.  In actuality the state governments have: i) used police 
force, ii) influenced conciliation proceedings, iii) rejected a dispute from progressing to 
adjudication, and iv) decided not to implement the ruling or awards of a Labor Court or 
Industrial Tribunal (Sen Gupta and Sett, 2005): 
 
"The minister or the chief minister of the state entered the scene in the 
guise of a conciliator interested in finding an amicable settlement to the 
dispute. Then, taking advantage of the glaring weaknesses of the existing 
law (like absence of provisions for statutory union recognition or, 
foolproof method for union membership verification) and using their 
formidable political clout, they forced settlements which favoured trade 
unions, union leaders or employers of their choice…The history of 
industrial disputes in India is replete with instances of abuse of political 
power and subversion of dispute settlement machinery to promote political 
interests (Government of India, 1968; Ramaswamy 1984)."  
 
We define the labels left, right, and center such that political parties intervene to promote 
favorable outcomes for workers, employers, or neither respectively. Parties oriented to 
the center have no sympathies towards either parties or have had ambiguous or changing 
preferences. From the first general elections to the early 1970s, the Congress government 
protected workers rights through the central sphere and faced a slight but increasing trend 
in industrial disputes (Figure 1). It was only until the national railway strike in the mid 
1970s that the government cracked down on industrial strikes. During the early 
liberalization period from the 1980s Congress switched its stance by pushing towards 
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private sector involvement and withdrew its interventionist behavior in labor disputes 
over the next two decades which contributed to the decline in bargaining power of 
workers. The swing from pro-worker to liberal policies prompts us to label Congress 
parties as center.  Regional parties have no clear cut evidence of pro-worker or pro-
business preference. The Islamic parties promote religious representation for greater 
integration of its people in the economy (Vanaik, 2006). The early socialist parties had 
their economic policies in line with the Congress (Mehra et al, 2003). We identify all 
these groups as having a center orientation.16 
 
The Hindutva and liberal parties, of which the BJP is the dominant party, have targeted 
their economic policies towards promoting free enterprise (Gosh, 2003). It was only 
during one general election period in 1984 when the party changed its stance towards 
Gandhism but it is doubtful if this had an effect on disputes considering that it was only a 
shift in tactic to gain votes rather than changing economic policy.  Following the 
literature we classify these parties as right (see Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004). Previous 
studies classify the Janata Party as a centrist party; however we choose to code the Janata 
Party as a rightist party as it was quite progressive when it came to power at the center in 
1977. The party sought to allow foreign capital to enter to drive the manufacturing 
industry and economy. In response to the industrial climate it introduced a bill to ban 
strikes and lockouts in certain industries but was severely opposed mostly by unions 
(Sengupta, 1992). This was at a time when the person-days lost in disputes were nearly 
equivalent from strikes and lockouts hinting that unions were still more worried about 
losing bargaining power by not being able to strike than employers were from the 
inability to exercise lockouts. If the bill had passed, it would have affected the de jure 
labor laws, but it gives us a sense that the Janata Party were trying to reduce industrial 
conflict which would have favored businesses. Furthermore, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh 
(BJS) was a part of the Janata Party and is a direct ancestor of the BJP (Graham, 1987) 
implying some overlap of policies between the Janata Party and the BJP. 
                                               
16 The political science literature commonly classifies regional parties and the Congress as centrist parties. 
Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) examine the effects of ideological competition on delivery of public goods 
by coding regional parties and the Congress as centrists, and the communist and socialist parties as having 
a left orientation. Our main results do not change if we assign socialists a left political orientation. Lahiri 
and Yi (2006) also do not include the socialist parties when measuring leftist vote share.  
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It has often been found that industrial disputes are supported in favor of workers in states 
with parties oriented to the left (Lahiri and Yi, forthcoming). For instance, the communist 
government in Kerala has been an ardent supporter of protecting workers through 
restricting “labor-displacing technologies” in the labor intensive industries and being 
strict on working conditions and hiring practices (Heller, 1997). This may in turn result in 
greater turmoil in the industrial climate. In the state of West Bengal, Lahiri and Yi 
(forthcoming) find that vote share of the leftist parties is positively correlated with the 
incidence of industrial action (measured by the ratios of days lost to days worked) caused 
by strikes, lockouts, and the like. In a recent article the CPM acknowledged backing all 
national strikes of trade unions opposed to the central government’s “neo-liberal 
policies”.17 This adds another dimension in that not only can political parties intervene in 
the state machinery but they can also instigate disputes for workers’ causes.   We assign 
the communist party and other leftist parties a left orientation as the latter have often 
formed coalitions with the former and fight for pro-worker causes. 
 
To proxy how left leaning the state legislature is in promoting or supporting workers 
interests, we construct a variable Left as the sum of share of seats of the four communist 
parties and 32 leftist parties won during Assembly elections. The share of left seats won 
can vary from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1 and remains constant for the election 
year and all subsequent years prior to the next election year. Left can be interpreted as the 
number of seats held by communist and leftist party in the state legislature.  Figure 4 
shows the presence of left parties from 1957 to 2004 for 16 states. Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh show low and declining levels of left parties in the state 
legislature. Andhra Pradesh, Assam and Tamil Nadu also have relatively low share of left 
seats which is below the 20 percent mark. Kerala and West Bengal have the largest share 
of legislative seats held by communist and other leftist parties. Barring Bihar, the 
remaining states have a negligible left presence. 
 
                                               
17 Source: Times of India, 29 August 2008, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/CPM_stands_by_right_to_strike/articleshow/3419105.cms. 
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To show that our proxy for implementation of labor laws factors in the critique of Besley-
Burgess’s classification of states and resembles the actual labor market conditions as 
reported by other studies, we highlight the discrepancies between our two explanatory 
variables (section 4.3 addresses the issue of linearity). Of interest in Table 3 are the 
“Mean” column of Left, the “Classification” column of Besley and Burgess (2004), and 
the column labeled Hasan et al (2007). The states of Assam, Bihar, and Punjab have a 5.2, 
11.9 and 6.2 percent of combined communist and leftist parties in the state but enjoy a 
neutral classification for its labor law orientation. Most strikingly, Gujarat and Kerala 
take on opposite classifications, with the former experiencing a near zero share of left 
seats in the state but classified as pro-worker, and the latter tagged as pro-employer 
despite 44.2 percent of seats occupied by the left. In comparison, Left is more consistent 
with the Hansan et al (2007) labor market flexibility categorization. Notwithstanding the 
differences in classification of states, the variation of our proxy for labor law 
implementation is independent of the classifications. Grouping states according to Besley 
and Burgess (2004), Table 4 shows that pro-worker states experienced the least volatility 
in presence of left parties in the legislative assemblies, on average, and for all decennial 
periods except the 1980s, pro-worker states saw a smaller fluctuation than pro-employer 
states. Interestingly neutral and pro-business states show an increasing trend in volatility 
of left presence. Re-categorizing Kerala as pro-worker and Maharashtra as pro-business 
(Goswami et al., 2002), does not change the overall pattern of the coefficient of variation. 
 
To quantitatively justify the use of Left we compare it with the other two political 
orientations. We regress registered manufacturing outcome on share of seats held by right 
parties and center parties separately. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 5 show that the right 
progressive political parties and the center have a positive significant level and 
interaction effect on registered manufacturing output with and without controls. Column 
(5) and (6) regress registered manufacturing output on Right and Center again but for the 
reduced sample running from 1974 to 1997. We find that while the interaction of Right 
and labor regulation retains its significance, the interaction of center and labor regulation 
loses its significance at the 10 percent level. From 1974 onwards we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient on the interaction term is zero thereby lending support to 
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our classification of parties; center and right parties have a different influence than the 
left.     
3.3. Control Variables 
We control for state development expenditure as an overall indicator for measuring the 
level of state infrastructure and development. It includes expenditure on social services 
and economic services (see Appendix C) and is expressed as log of real development 
expenditure per capita terms.  
 
We also use the total installed electricity per capita for each state as a measure for 
infrastructure. For infrastructure development Kochhar et al (2006) use transmission and 
distribution losses (T&D losses) of state level electricity boards as a fraction of 
generating capacity. However, we were unable to obtain this data and instead use total 
installed electricity per capita while being aware that quantity does not imply quality of 
infrastructure.18     
 
We include state literacy rates instead of primary and secondary school enrollment rates 
as a measure for quality and availability of human capital. 19  We follow Besley and 
Burgess (2004) and rely on state population as a measure for changing labor market 
conditions within a state.  
 
Purfield (2006) and Topalova (2008) use credit provided by scheduled commercial 
banks20 as a measure of financial development. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) find that 
financial development can foster faster long-run growth by reducing information and 
transaction costs. Burgess and Pande (2005) find that the state-led rural branch expansion 
program from 1977 to 1990 affected nonagricultural output and smaller manufacturing 
establishments. We suspect that higher level of credit availability will encourage 
registered manufacturing growth and possibly ease entry of new establishments. 
                                               
18 Kochhar et al (2006) also state that installed electricity capacity is for the most part determined by the 
central government and may be related to anticipated future growth. 
19 Trivedi (2002) finds that secondary school enrollment rates are positively related to economic growth 
and female education has greater impact on growth than male education. We were unable to access various 
issues of Census of India to construct this data. 
20 Scheduled commercial banks in India include the State bank of India and its subsidiaries, national and 
foreign banks, private banks, cooperative banks and regional rural banks. 
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Table 6 shows the pair-wise correlations between the controls used. State population is 
least correlated to other controls. Development expenditure is highly correlated to the 
remaining variables. We decide to use all variables as controls except bank credit as the 
high correlation may severely affect the standard errors of our estimates. 
 
To verify random sampling of the chosen states, we test that the chosen state 
characteristics do not differ based on the degree of leftness of a state and group states into 
the four quartiles of Left. We find that the controls for the four intensities of leftness 
differ from the overall mean (Table 7). Conducting multiple comparison tests reveals that 
development expenditure and literacy rates are significantly different or higher for the 
high left states when compared to low, low-medium, and medium left states. On 
excluding the states of Kerala and West Bengal, high left states no longer exhibit 
different means for development expenditure and literacy rates from the remaining 
groups of states. We revisit the issue of Kerala and West Bengal as outliers when 
verifying the robustness of our results. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Specification 
To study the affects of political orientation and labor regulation on economic and 
manufacturing outcome, we use a panel regression of the form: 
 
sttsstststststst XPRPRy    )*( 11 , (1) 
 
where sty  is the outcome variable in state s at time t. 1stR  is the regulatory measure 
lagged one time period to accommodate for the adjustment of statutory laws. stP  is the 
political orientation of state s the primary measure for which is Left, the share of seats 
held by hard communist and leftist parties in the state legislature. We do not lag this 
variable as we expect the state legislature to be fast moving in addressing workers’ 
interests, thereby having a more immediate effect on economic outcome. stX  represents 
the control variables used. In particular we control for state population, electricity power, 
literacy rates, and government developmental expenditure. States may commonly 
experience events during certain time periods; for instance, the central IDA amendments 
in 1976 and 1982, and the 1975 state of emergency declared under Article 352 of the 
Constitution of India. We use time fixed effects, denoted t , to account for such shocks 
affecting the manufacturing sector. In addition, ignoring characteristics unique to states 
could lead to a serious omitted variable bias. s is the state fixed effect that captures 
time-invariant features such as linguistic diversity and culture.   
 
The coefficient  depicts the level effect of labor regulation on manufacturing 
performance while   captures the impact of political complexion for a control state that 
has not amended a pro-worker or pro-employer regulation. The coefficient   yields the 
interaction of labor regulation and our de facto measure. We are interested in examining 
how implementation of labor regulation affects manufacturing performance and varies 
with the de jure labor market policies of a state, the total impact for which is given by the 
sum of the level effect and the product of the interaction effect and the state's labor 
legislation  ( 1 stR ). We predict the interaction term to be negative and significant for 
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our main outcome variable: log of real registered manufacturing output per capita. In 
unison with other studies, we cluster standard errors by state (see Bertrand, Mullainathan 
and Duflo, 2004) to address concerns of serial correlation of the error terms. 
 
The empirical strategy is closely related to Ahsan and Pagés (forthcoming) who interact 
labor regulation with share of contract employment in manufacturing to examine the 
effects of using contract labor in the formal sector as a means for employers to evade the 
IDA. However our fundamental approach differs as we look at a factor influencing 
implementation of the IDA rather than using a measure of employment activity governed 
by a different set of laws to help explain effects of the IDA on manufacturing outcome. 
 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Main results 
Before examining the effectiveness of labor laws on economic outcomes, we attempt to 
replicate the main results from Besley and Burgess (2004) using the modified regulatory 
index for the sample from 1970 to 1997. Panel A of Tables 8 to 13 presents the results 
where a negative coefficient for labor regulation implies that the dependent variable 
decreases with greater pro-worker state amendments to the IDA. We find that labor 
regulation has a reducing effect on the main outcome variable: registered 
manufacturing output (column (5), Table 8). Together, columns (5) and (6) confirm 
that pro-worker legislation discourages output in the formal sector and encourages 
production in the informal sector. The significance of the estimates holds on introducing 
controls (columns (5) and (6), Table 9). Although our main focus is on registered 
manufacturing output, we also study the effects of labor laws on employment, 
productivity, and investment. In Tables 10 and 11, pro-worker amendments lower 
employment and reduce the usage of workers (columns (1) to (3)). Table 13 shows that 
the negative impact of labor laws is significant at the 10 percent level for worker 
productivity (column (1)) and number of factories (column (4)) only on including 
controls. Note that we conduct all our analyses including and excluding controls to verify 
if our results are being driven by controls, as in the previous case, or if they lose 
significance on including controls due to omitted variable bias. We therefore assume 
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estimates that are significant at least at the 10 percent level, with and without controls, to 
be most reliable. The panel A results imply that the main Besley-Burgess results hold for 
our period of study, despite modifying the regulatory index, but with the notable 
exception that we find a negligible effect of labor regulation on capital stock. 
 
We also examine our proxy for implementation of labor laws in the absence of de jure 
laws (panel B) to see if higher values of the proxy for labor law implementation suggests 
a decline in manufacturing performance. Again, of primary concern is the relationship 
between registered manufacturing output and the left for which we find a negative 
relationship (column (5)) of Table 8 and 9). The effect on unregistered manufacturing 
output shows a positive but weak relationship (column (6), Table 8): It may be that the 
left promote public sector activities in the informal sector or cause movement from 
formal production to informal production. Of secondary concern is the influence of the 
left on other manufacturing outcomes. In Tables 10 and 11, shows a higher presence of 
the left in the state legislature to reduce employment levels (columns (1) and (2)) and the 
intensity of usage of currently employment workers (column (3)). It also seems that the 
left reduces entry or increases exit of factories (column (4), Tables 12 and 13). In other 
words entry decision is influenced based on the composition of the state legislature. 
 
We now discuss the findings of our full specification using registered manufacturing 
output as the principal indicator and other related sectors (panel C of Tables 8 and 9). 
First we find that total manufacturing, which includes formal and informal manufacturing, 
is lowered by higher left presence in the Legislative Assemblies and reduces further in 
states with pro-worker labor laws (column (4)). Formal manufacturing constitutes nearly 
65 percent21 of total manufacturing and is picking up the effects of labor regulation and 
implementation on registered manufacturing output. This is confirmed in column (5) 
where the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term is greater and highly 
significant. The negative sign of the coefficient on the interaction term in column (5) 
implies that a larger support for laborers in the state legislature reduces registered 
manufacturing output even further when pro-worker amendments are made. 
                                               
21 Author’s estimate. 
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Hypothetically, if the left in a state enacting one cumulative pro-worker amendment – 
such as Orissa – held 10 percentage points share of seats more, then organized 
manufacturing output per capita would reduce by approximately 3 percent. Evidently a 
greater cumulative number of pro-worker amendments enacted or a higher presence of 
communist and leftist parties will result in a larger negative impact on registered 
manufacturing. In contrast enactment of labor laws and our proxy for enforcement hint 
weakly at increasing manufacturing output in the informal sector column (6). The effect 
on total net state domestic product and other sectors is more difficult to discern given the 
large standard errors (columns (1), (2), and (3)), but in comparison the manufacturing 
sector is most linked to the labor market indicators. Establishing the impact of 
effectiveness of labor laws on our main indicator for manufacturing performance, the 
remaining discussion concerns employment, productivity and investment.  
 
Concerning employment, Table 10 and 11 shows weak evidence that states with pro-
worker amendments experience a larger reduction in employment of workers (column 
(1)), and employment of workers and supervisors combined (column (2)), with a pro-
worker bias in the state legislature in comparison to states with pro-employer amendment. 
Moreover, employers reduce the daily employment or intensity with which workers are 
used in states with pro-workers laws and a larger legislature with a left orientation 
(column (3)). However, the coefficient on the level effect of the left positively influences 
daily employment when controlling for labor regulation or in states with no pro-worker 
laws. This could be in anticipation to future pro-worker laws so employers expropriate 
more out of the currently employed workers. Workers also don’t seem to be gaining in 
terms of wages (column (4)) and income share (column (5)). Overall workers do not 
seem to benefit from greater protection through labor institutions and sympathy from 
political parties. 
 
The evidence shows that employers too are affected with pro-workers laws and the left. 
The negative interaction coefficient in column (1) of Tables 12 and 13 suggests that 
greater strength of the left in the state legislature impedes worker productivity when pro-
worker laws are in place. Pro-worker laws that are implemented may result in excess 
employment in the case of job protection laws or allow workers to provide sub-standard 
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or sub-optimal effort. For instance, amendments increasing job protection allow workers 
to take comfort as employers may face higher firing costs. As a result workers in the 
formal sector may have a lesser incentive to work harder. There is no evidence that 
workers are able to expropriate part of capital stock (column (2)) or investment flow 
(column (3)) despite protection from institutions. This coincides with the survey studies 
of Sharma and Sasikumar (1996) and Deshpande et al (2004); both studies find a lack of 
evidence on labor laws impeding fixed capital investments. The decision of firm’s to 
register their plants is nonetheless affected by the regulatory labor market environment 
and the political outlook. The level effect of the left is positive and highly significant but 
is reduced by the negative coefficient on the interaction terms (column (4)). We speculate 
that the left may take measures to prevent factories from closing as government 
permission is required for closure. Some observers mention that in the case of public 
enterprises, state governments have prevented closures even if factories are running at a 
loss so as to prevent redundancy of workers. While data was available by factory 
ownership (private versus public) at the national level, we were unable to obtain data at 
the state level to test the hypothesis. As for the average firm size expressed in number of 
workers in column (5), the coefficients of the level and interaction effects take on 
opposite signs to that in column (4).  We uncover that pro-left states experience a greater 
reduction in the average plant size relative to pro-center and pro-right states. Pro-worker 
regulation seems to counter this reduction. Again, national level data for factory size 
distribution is insufficient to conduct a state level analysis. We are unable to verify if the 
increase average firm size is due to a fall in registration of medium and smaller size 
factories as they choose to stay small to avoid the restriction of the formal labor market.  
 
4.2.2. Differences in political orientation 
We now would like to examine how left-wing parties compare to the other extreme – 
right-wing parties – by determining how an increase in the share of left parties in the state 
legislature alters the responsiveness of manufacturing performance to pro-worker labor 
laws. To do this we modify the specification by controlling for parties oriented towards 
the center:  
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  )*()*( 111 stststststststst CenterRCenterLeftRLeftRy 
sttsstX    
(2) 
 
Specification (2) adds to specification (1) the share of seats in the Legislative Assemblies 
held by parties with an orientation to the center, namely Center, and interacts Center with 
the statutory labor laws in place. We can now examine the effects of the left and center 
relative to the right (the omitted category), on economic outcome. Column (5) in Table 
14 confirms our main finding that the left reduce registered manufacturing output 
more in states where pro-worker laws are enacted. The magnitude of this effect is greater 
on controlling for center parties in comparison to the coefficient in column (5) of Table 9. 
Also, the coefficient on the interaction between the left and labor regulation picks up the 
negative impact on non-agricultural output and total manufacturing output (columns (3) 
and (4) respectively) as both outcomes incorporate the registered manufacturing sector. 
The results for the remaining outcomes are similar to our findings using specification (1): 
the regressors fail to explain employment levels but show high significance for intensity 
of usage of workers, worker productivity, value-added per employee, number of factories 
and average factory size.   
 
The results in section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 suggest that political orientation influences 
manufacturing performance and its responsiveness to the level of labor regulation. A 
higher presence of communist parties and leftist parties increase the implementation of 
pro-worker laws thereby worsening the impact of labor regulation on our chief indicator 
for the formal manufacturing sector: registered manufacturing output. Additionally we 
find adjustment to employment usage downwards, a decline in worker productivity, and 
reduction in registration of factories to be associated with pro-worker legislation in states 
with a more accommodating state legislature towards workers’ interests. We find less 
evidence on the impact on employment of workers and employees, wages to workers, 
capital stock, and flow of investments. Our results also hold when controlling for center-
leaning parties emphasizing that the left-leaning and right-leaning political parties differ 
in their attitude towards labor issues.  
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4.2.3. State-industry variation 
To alleviate concerns of biased estimates due to industrial specialization, we further 
examine data at the state-industry level. We estimate the following specification: 
 
isttisistststststist tXLeftRLeftRy    )*( 11 , (3) 
 
where the subscripts i, s, and t denote the industry, state and year respectively. isty is the 
state-industry outcome at time t,  ti is the industry specific time trend, is  is the state-
industry fixed effect; and ist  is the error term. We cluster standard errors by state and 
industry to tackle auto correlation of the error terms.  
 
The state-industry variation confirms our main result. Column (1) of Table 15 shows a 
negative coefficient for the interaction between labor regulation and the leftness of the 
state legislature on excluding and including controls. Again, coefficients significant at the 
10 percent level in both panels A and B imply that the estimates are robust on the 
inclusion of controls and are not being driven by the controls. 
 
There is some evidence, although weak, that the left reduce other outcomes more in pro-
worker regulated states. Workers employed and total employment (columns (2) and (3)) 
decline with pro-worker enactment of labor laws and pro-labor state legislatures. The 
effects on the remaining outcomes (columns (4) to (10)) are not significant at the 10 
percent level on excluding or including controls. 
 
We further examine if our explanatory terms depends on industry characteristics by 
considering the model:   
  )*()*()*( 111 ististststststist ZLeftZRLeftRLeftRy   
isttisististst tXZLeftR   )**( 1 , 
(4) 
where iZ  is the industry characteristic. Since we perform a within estimation we cannot 
include an own term for industry characteristics as it only varies by industry. In addition 
to the coefficients from specification (3) there are three more coefficients to be estimated 
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to reveal if the labor market conditions affect manufacturing outcomes differently for 
different industry characteristics. 
 
The industries in our data set differ in their labor or capital intensities so we investigate if 
labor market rigidity affects manufacturing outcomes differently for sectors with varying 
capital intensities. Industries such as textiles, furniture, food, and tobacco are low in 
capital intensity while manufacturing of chemicals, rubber, metal and alloys, non-metal, 
and equipment are capital intensive. We find that pro-worker regulation and the left in the 
state legislature do not affect our main outcome – registered manufacturing output – 
differently for capital and less capital intensive sectors (Table 16, column (1)). The only 
outcome for which there is a significant impact is the average factory size.  The negative 
coefficient on the interaction of labor regulation, Left, and capital intensity (column (10)) 
implies that factories size changes with capital intensity of industries when labor laws are 
enacted and implemented. Evidently, the estimates for the coefficients  ,  ,   , and   
indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of seats held by the left in states 
with one cumulative pro-worker amendment, reduces the average factory size by 2.4% 
for the textile industry, a highly labor intensity industry (Table 17). Industries with a 
capital intensity equivalent of the textiles industry and upwards to the electricity industry, 
experience an increase in average factory size in states enacting a pro-worker amendment 
in response to a marginal increase in share of seats won by left parties in the state 
legislature. For instance, industries with the mean level of capital intensity in our sample 
face a 2.1% increase in the average factory size in states with one cumulative pro-worker 
law and a marginal increase in left presence in the state legislature by 10 percentage 
points. The results suggest that labor intensive industries are harder hit in factory size as a 
result of pro-worker enactment and enforcement of labor laws. 
 
4.3. Linearity of Explanatory Variables 
In this section we briefly discuss the issue of linearity between labor regulation and the 
share of seats won by left parties in the state legislature. Linearity between the two would 
imply that the left in the state legislature amend the IDA with pro-worker laws, thereby 
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preventing us from identifying a proxy for implementation that is different from the labor 
regulation index.    
 
To test for linearity we regress the de jure labor regulation index on the share of seats 
held by the left. Using state fixed effects and controlling for state time-variant 
characteristics, column (1) of Table 18 shows that Left is strongly and positively 
correlated to labor regulation. We suspect that the correlation is being caused by West 
Bengal where the communist parties have ruled for most of the period from 1970 to 1997 
and have also enacted pro-worker amendments to the IDA. Column (2) shows the 
coefficient for Left is no longer significant at the 10 percent in the sample without the 
state of West Bengal. Column (3) yields a positive but statistically insignificant estimate 
for share of left seats when including all states but for the reduced period running from 
1977 to 1997. From Figure 3 we can see that the combined share of seats held by the 
communist and the leftist parties in West Bengal does not vary much although the state 
continues to enact pro-worker laws (Figure 4). During this period the share of left seats 
averages 69 percent but with a low standard deviation of only 3.5 percent. 1977 also 
marks the end of the state of emergency which was followed by a rise of opposition 
parties to the Congress. The Indian polity also changed in that a coalition government in 
the state legislature was no longer uncommon. In other words political competition 
intensified. Fiscal studies have shown that intensified competition and coalition 
governments have led to better performance of the state but failure in terms of making the 
more “politically difficult” reforms (Lalvani, 2003). Making difficult political decisions 
or economic reforms are a problem for a coalition government which is constrained by 
greater instability as consent from all parties of the coalition is required to remain in 
power. It would not be surprising then if the coalition government or less dominance by a 
single party at the state legislature could cause the difficult reform of enactment of labor 
laws to differ from the implementation of labor laws.22 This may therefore help explain 
why the state legislature is least correlated with statutory labor laws from 1977 onwards, 
                                               
22  Following Lalvani (2005) we construct a dummy variable and set it to 1 for years when the state 
government is formed by a coalition, and set it to 0 otherwise. We find a positive and insignificant 
correlation between left and the coalition dummy for 1970 to 1997, but the standard error reduces from 
1977 to 1997 to yield significance at the 25 percent level. The coalition dummy and the labor regulation 
index is however uncorrelated for the entire period under investigation.  
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implying that there is less concern that our constructed measure is picking up the same 
effect as the labor regulation index. In the following section we test if the results from the 
previous section are reliable. 
 
4.4. Robustness 
We subject our findings to a series of robustness checks. First, we consider two tests for 
outlier states and one test for outlier observations. Second, we use two alternate measures 
to proxy for pro-worker implementation of labor laws. Third, we modify the timing of 
implementation of labor laws in the baseline specification. 
 
4.4.1. Outlier states 
Testing for single outlier states, we use specification (1) and drop and replace one state at 
a time from the sample. We estimate the specification for the case of registered 
manufacturing output and the remaining 15 dependent variables, thereby performing 
1536 regressions in total. We only report the extreme (minimum and maximum) 
coefficients. In addition, we list those states which if omitted from the sample yield 
significant estimates at the 10 percent level or below.  
 
The estimation using the chief outcome of interest, registered manufacturing output, 
produces a significant coefficient for the interaction between statutory laws and the left 
when dropping each state except West Bengal (Table 19, outcome 5a, column (3)). 
Although the coefficient is negative with magnitude 0.081, the significance is well above 
the 10 percent level. We perform an additional regression to find that dropping West 
Bengal from the sample indeed yields a negative and significant coefficient for the 
reduced sample time period from 1980 to 1997: the coefficient for the interaction term 
ranges from a minimum of -0.307 to a maximum of -1.503 (outcome 5b, column (3)) all 
of which are significant. 23 This alleviates concerns that West Bengal is driving our main 
result.  
 
                                               
23 Including controls, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant from 1977 onwards 
but is significant only from 1980 onwards when excluding controls. We therefore select the period starting 
1980 to be most robust. 
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The interaction coefficients (column (3)) on daily employment, factory registration, and 
average factory size (outcomes 9, 15, and16 respectively) pass the test for single outliers. 
For the remaining outcomes this exercise reveals some insight on the lack of strong 
evidence of the explanatory power of the labor laws and the state legislature. There is no 
sub-sample that yields a significant interaction coefficient at the 10 percent level for 
workers employed and total employment (outcomes 7 and 8, column (3)). However the 
sign of the coefficients is positive for all but one sample: the sample without West Bengal. 
This suggests, although weakly, that the left in West Bengal seems to worsen 
employment with pro-worker legislation in contrast to the left in other states that seem to 
increase employment. As a further check we estimate the level effect of the original 
unmodified labor regulation index on employment for the full sample period of the 
Besley and Burgess (2004) study and find that the negative coefficient is no longer 
significant at the 10 percent level on excluding West Bengal. 24 Therefore the Besley-
Burgess claim that labor legislation significantly lowers employment levels in the formal 
manufacturing sector is not robust. Our previous finding of the weak significance of 
explanatory variables on workers’ earnings is due to the left in states of Orissa and West 
Bengal (outcome 10, column (3)). Only when we omit either of these states from the 
sample do we find a negative and significant impact on workers’ earnings. Column (3) of 
outcome 11 shows that workers’ income share reduces when excluding West Bengal but 
the income share increases when including West Bengal in 4 out of 15 cases. The 
negative coefficient (column (3)) for value added per employee (outcome 12) is also not 
robust: it is insignificant at the 10 percent level only for sub-sample excluding West 
Bengal, thereby indicating that the left parties in West Bengal may improve benefits 
going to workers or reduce the negative impact of labor regulation and the left on worker 
productivity in other states. All together, the interaction coefficients from outcomes 7 to 
12 suggest that the left in West Bengal worsen employment levels but increase the 
workers’ earnings, share of income going to workers, and worker productivity relative to 
the left in other states.  
 
                                               
24 results not shown. 
 34 
Since Kerala and West Bengal are the two states with the highest presence of left parties 
in the state legislature, we re-estimate specification (1) by excluding both these states to 
check if they are driving the results.  Column (4) of Table 20 shows a negative but 
insignificant estimate at the 10 percent level for the interaction term on registered 
manufacturing output. An additional test with the reduced sample running from 1977 to 
1997 however generates a statistically significant coefficient (column (5)): Excluding 
both West Bengal and Kerala rejects the null hypothesis that the left affect registered 
manufacturing output independently of a state’s enactment of labor regulation.  The 
interaction coefficients are also robust in the case of daily employment, factories, and 
workers per factory, columns (9), (15), and (16) respectively.  
 
Using the full sample of 16 states we verify if our results hold on excluding outlier 
observations. Observations where the share of leftist and communist seats held in the 
state legislature is 50 percent or more are excluded when estimating specification (1). Our 
sample discards 34 observations occurring for the states of Kerala and West Bengal. As 
seen in column (4) of Table 21, the product of labor regulation and the left no longer 
impacts registered manufacturing output at the 10 percent level, although the negative 
sign is retained. We do in fact uncover significance for the reduced period from 1977 to 
1997 (column (5)) which supports our argument that labor regulation lowers registered 
manufacturing output even more in states with greater pro-worker politicians in the 
Legislative Assemblies. Apart from our main outcome we interestingly find that workers 
employed and total employment increase with a greater pro-worker state legislature and 
pro-worker labor laws (columns (7) and (8)) in support of our findings when testing for 
single outliers. Similarly workers’ wages and productivity are negatively affected 
(columns (10) and (12)): omitting the extreme observations from West Bengal gives more 
weight to the observations in other states. Again, the effectiveness of labor regulation to 
explain adjustment of usage of workers, factory registration, and factory size is robust. 
 
4.4.2. Alternate measures of Left 
To allay concerns that our measure Left may include political parties that don’t 
necessarily have a clearly defined prejudice towards worker’s concerns, we replace the 
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proxy with a measure of share of seats held by the four communist parties of India; we 
have already argued that the communist parties promote interests of workers. We 
continue to find support for the main result: registered manufacturing output is 
lowered by more sympathetic politicians and this effect is more pronounced in states 
enacting pro-worker laws (Table 22, column (5)). The magnitude of the interaction term 
is only marginally larger than the estimated coefficient in column (5), panel C of Table 9. 
The results for the remaining outcomes are similar to the case when using leftist and 
communist parties for labor law implementation.   
 
It could be argued that governments in power have a stronger influence on industrial 
disputes than minority non-ruling parties in the state legislature. We replace Left by 
constructing a dummy variable and set it to 1, for all years in which one of the four 
communist parties formed the ruling government, either as a single party or a coalition 
government. A significant and high correlation of 0.76 between the communist dummy 
and the earlier proxies used, leads to similar results. Specifically, manufacturing output 
in the organized sector is lowered with pro-worker statutory labor laws and the extent to 
which it lowered depends on the composition of the legislative assemblies (Table 23, 
column (5)). Not surprisingly we also find employment to reduce significantly with pro-
worker laws, and more so with communist parties ruling the state as the dummy variable 
places a greater weight on the communist parties in West Bengal.  
 
4.4.3. Timing of the legislative assemblies 
Specification (1) uses the current number of seats won by the left parties with immediate 
effect of the elected politicians to the state legislature. We believe that the state 
legislature is faster moving than labor institutions. However, if the newly elected state 
legislature requires time to implement its polities then Left could be lagged by one time 
period. Another argument for lagging Left would be that elections don’t necessarily 
coincide with the fiscal year. We therefore modify the specification to include lags for the 
Left for the level effect and the interaction effect. Table 24 presents our findings of which 
the most important result in column (5). The left continue to have an adverse impact on 
registered manufacturing output and this effect is worse in states with pro-worker laws 
in place. The magnitude of this interaction effect is higher than when using the original 
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specification without lagging Left: a 10 percentage point increase in the share of seats 
held by the left parties reduces registered manufacturing output by nearly 5.8 percent in 
states enacting one cumulative pro-worker amendment. The outstanding dependent 
variables also show similar interactions to that found in panel C of Tables 9, 11, and 13. 
Also, the coefficients of the interaction term on employment (column (7) and (8)), 
workers’ wages (column (10)) and worker productivity (column (12)) are significant at 
the 10 percent level. 
 
4.4.4. Summary of robustness checks 
Consolidating the results from the robustness checks we find the effects of labor 
regulation and left parties on registered manufacturing output to be most robust for the 
period 1980 to 1997. What explains the significance for this reduced time period? 
Manufacturing output is not significantly different among states when comparing 
production in 1970-79 to 1980-89. From Table 4 one can infer that the volatility in Left 
for all the states in aggregate does not change much from the period 1970-79 to 1980-89. 
However, on excluding West Bengal the volatility of left does increase for the remaining 
states on a whole. In addition, most amendments to the IDA were made following the 
1977 state of emergency. Therefore the variation in both explanatory terms seems to be 
able to explain the performance in the manufacturing sector. The years 1980 to 1997  
coincide with the period for which our measure for pro-worker political orientation is 
uncorrelated with the de jure labor regulation measure possibly due to greater party 
competition and changing dynamics of the Indian polity. Furthermore, some 
industrialized states have a high presence of the left while other (industrialized) states 
have a low presence of the left which alleviates concerns that highly industrialized states 
tend to enact laws favoring workers. These issues therefore ease concerns of reverse 
causality between registered manufacturing output and left for the reduced time period. 
 
Table 25 confirms that the interaction effects on daily employment, factory registration, 
and average factory size are maintained and significant even for the reduced sample 
period running from 1980 to 1997 (columns (9), (15), and (16)). The negative estimates 
for employment (columns (7) and (8)) and workers’ wages (column (10)) are significant 
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only when including controls and are not robust to the check for single outlier states.25 
Overall it seems that the left political parties in West Bengal worsen employment levels 
but increase the wages to workers, income share of workers, and value added per worker, 
relative to the left in other states.  
                                               
25 results not included. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study empirically investigates how the implementation of labor laws can affect state-
level manufacturing performance based on statutory labor laws. Given that states 
intervene in arbitrating disputes in India – through inaction, conciliation, or referring for 
adjudication – to affect dispute outcomes in favor businesses or laborers, we proxy for 
pro-worker implementation of labor laws by measuring the strength of leftist and 
communist parties in the state legislature. Our main finding is that lower manufacturing 
output in the registered sector is correlated with greater strength of the left in the state 
legislature, and this relationship is intendisfied in states enacting pro-worker labor laws. 
The evidence is robust for the Indian experience from 1980 to 1997.    
 
Using other measures for economic performance we also find the negative impact of pro-
worker regulation on the intensity of labor usage, and factory registration, is worse in 
states with a greater presence of the left. Leftness of the state legislature also reduces the 
average factory size, but it increases with enforcement of laws only in states that have a 
highly pro-worker environment. We find no evidence in support of the expropriation 
effect where labor regulation deters investment. The state-industry variation shows a lack 
of evidence that the impact of enactment and enforcement of labor laws affects labor and 
capital intensive sectors differently, but the average factory size reduces for 
establishments in labor intensive sectors.    
 
Overall we find that in the absence of a de facto labor law measure, our proxy for pro-
worker orientation captures a glimpse of labor market practices by amplifying the effect 
of pro-workers amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act and lends some support to the 
distortionist view on labor regulation. Underlying this exercise is the fact that suitable 
measures to proxy actual labor conditions can better approximate the impact of labor 
regulation for countries lacking an efficient enforcement framework. Although India has 
machinery in place to facilitate labor disputes, there is a need to improve the 
implementation process or update its laws so that statutory laws can be better transformed 
into actual labor market practices. Over 100 developing countries have revised their labor 
laws in the face of globalization (Sharma, 2006) – India should follow suit.
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Appendix B: Abbreviations 
 
States of India 
Acronym Name 
AP Andhra Pradesh 
AS Assam 
BH Bihar 
GJ Gujarat 
HR Haryana 
JK Jammu & Kashmir 
KA Karnataka 
KE Kerala 
MP Madhya Pradesh 
MH Maharashtra 
OR Orissa 
PJ Punjab 
RJ Rajasthan 
TN Tamil Nadu 
UP Uttar Pradesh 
WB West Bengal 
 
 
Political Parties 
Acronym Name 
ABHM AKHIL BHARAT HINDU MAHASABHA 
ABHS AKHIL BHARATIYA SENA 
ABLTC AKHIL BHARATIYA LOK TANTRIK CONGRESS 
AD  APNA DAL 
ADK / ADMK ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
ADK(JL) ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM(JAYALALITA GROUP) 
ADK(JR) 
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM(JANAKI 
RAMACHANDRAN) 
ADM AKALI DAL MASTER TARA SINGH GROUP 
ADS AKALI DAS SANT FATEH SINGH GROUP 
AGP ASOM GANA PARISHAD 
AGP(P) ASOM GANA PARISHAD PRAGTISHEEL 
AHL ALL PARTY HILL LEADERS CONGRESS / PLAIN TRIBALS COUNCIL OF ASSAM 
AIFB ALL INDIA FORWARD BLOCK 
AIIC(T) ALL INDIA INDIRA CONGRESS (TIWARI) 
AIMIM ALL INDIA MAJLIS-E ITHEHAD-UL MUSLIMEEN 
AIRJP ALL INDIA RASHTRIYA JANATA PARTY 
AITC ALL INDIA TRINAMOOL CONGRESS 
AJBP AJEYA BHARAT PARTY 
AKD  AMBEDKAR KRANTI DAL 
ASDC AUTONOMOUS STATE DEMAND COMMITTEE 
ASDC(U) AUTONOMOUS STATE DEMAND COMMITTEE (UNITED) 
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Acronym Name 
BAC BANGLA CONGRESS 
BAS AKHIL BHARTIYA ARYA SABHA 
BBC BHARATIYA BIPLABAI COMMUNIST PARTY 
BBM BHARIPA BAHUJAN MAHASANGHA 
BJD BIJU JANATA DAL 
BJP BHARTIYA JANTA PARTY 
BJS ALL INDIA BHARTIYA JAN SANGH 
BKD BHARATIYA KRANTI DAL 
BKKGP  --- 
BLD BHARTIYA LOK DAL 
BPP BHARTIYA PRAGATISHEEL PARTY 
BRP BHARATIYA RASHTRIYA PARTY 
BSP BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY 
CMM CHHATTISGARH MUKTI MORCHA 
CMPKSC COMMUNIST MARXIST PARTY KERALA STATE COMMITTEE 
CNPSPJP JANATA 
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA 
CPI(ML)(L) COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST-LENINIST)(LIBERATION) 
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (Marxist) 
CRC CONGRESS REFORMS COMMITTEE 
CVP CHAMPARAN VIKAS PARTY 
DM DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT 
DMK DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
DSP(PC) DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY (PRABODH CHANDRA) 
FB(S)  FORWARD BLOC (SOCIALIST) 
GGP GONDVANA GANTANTRA PARTY 
GKC  GANDHI KAMRAJ NATIONAL CONGRESS 
GNLF  GORKHA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
HJS PROGRESSIVE HULL JHARKHAND PARTY (SHIBU GROUP) 
HLS HARYANA LOK SAMITI 
HSD HINDUSTANI SHOSHIT DAL 
HVP HARYANA VIKAS PARTY 
ICJ / ICJ(BG) INDIAN CONGRESS (JAGJIVAN RAM - BHALLA GROUP) 
ICS INDIAN CONGRESS (SOCIALIST) 
ICS(SCS) INDIAN CONGRESS (SOCIALIST-SARAT CHANDRA SINHA) 
IGL ALL INDIA GORKHA LEAGUE 
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 
INC(I) INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS(I) 
INC(O) INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (O) ANTI MERGER GROUP 
INC(U) INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS(Urs) 
INL  INDIAN NATIONAL LEAGUE 
INLD INDIAN NATIONAL LOK DAL 
IPF INDIAN PEOPLES FRONT 
ISP --- 
IUML/IML INDIAN UNION MUSLIM LEAGUE 
JAC (ORISSA) JAN CONGRESS 
JD JANTA DAL 
JD(S) JANTA DAL (Secular) 
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Acronym Name 
JD(U) JANTA DAL (UNITED) 
JHP JHARKHAND PARTY / DAL 
JKAL J&K AWAMI LEAGUE 
JKD JAN KRANTI DAL 
JKN J&K NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
JKP ALL INDIA JHARKHAND PARTY 
JKP J&K PEOPLES CONFERENCE 
JKP(N)  JHARKHAND PARTY (NOREN) 
JMI JAMAIT-I-ISLAMI, J&K 
JMM / (M) / (S) JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA / (MARDI) / (SOREN) 
JNP JANATA PARTY 
JNP(JP) JANATA PARTY (JP) 
JNP(SC) JANATA PARTY (SECULAR) - CH. CHARAN SINGH 
JNP(SR) JANATA PARTY (SECULAR) - RAJ NARAIN 
JPP JANTA PAKSHA PARTY 
JPP JHARKHAND PEOPLE'S PARTY 
JPP / JKNPP J&K PANTHERS PARTY 
JPSS JANADHIPATHIYA SAMREKSHNA SAMITI 
JSS JAN SURAJYA SHAKTI 
KC / KEC KERALA CONGRESS 
KCJ KERALA CONGRESS (JACOB) 
KCM / KEC(M) KERALA CONGRESS (M) 
KCP KARNATAKA CONGRESS PARTY 
KCP KERALA CONGRESS (PILLAI GROUP) 
KCVP KANNADA CHALAVALI VATAL PAKSHA 
KEC(B) KERALA CONGRESS (B) 
KLP KISAN MAZDOOR LOK PAKSHA 
KMP  UTTARPRADESH KISAN MAZDOOR PARTY 
KNDP KANNADA NADU PARTY 
KRS / KRRS KARNATAKA RAJYA RYOTA SANGHA 
KSM KRANTIKARI SAMAJWADI MANCH 
KSP KERALA SOCIALIST PARTY 
KSP KOSAL PARTY 
LJNSP / LJP LOK JAN SHAKTI PARTY 
LKD LOK DAL 
LKD(B) LOK DAL (B) 
LSS LOK SEWAK SANGH 
LTC LOK TANTRIK CONGRESS 
MADMK M.G.R.ANNA D.M.KAZHAGAM 
MBT MAJLIS BACHAO TAHREEK 
MCO / MCOR MARXIST CO-ORDINATION 
MES MAHARASHTRA EKIKARAN SAMITI 
ML / MUL MUSLIM LEAGUE KERALA STATE COMMITTEE 
MLO MUSLIM LEAGUE KERALA (OPPOSITION) 
MVC MAHARASHTRA VIKAS CONGRESS 
NAGP NATUN ASOM GANA PARISHAD 
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Acronym Name 
NC NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
NCO INDIAN NATIONAL CONGREGRESS (ORGANIZATION) 
NCP NATIONALIST CONGRESS PARTY 
NDF  INDIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
NDP / NLP NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
NJP NUTAN MAHA GUJARAT JANTA PARISHAD 
NVAS NAG VIDARBHA ANDOLAN SAMITI 
NVPP NATIVE PEOPLE'S PARTY 
OGP ORISSA GANA PARISHAD 
PDF PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
PDP PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
PHJ BIHAR PRANT HUL JHARKHAND 
PJP  PUNJAB JANTA PARTY 
PMK PATTALI MAKKAL KATCHI 
PML  PROGRESSIVE MUSLIM LEAGUE 
PP PRAJA PARISHAD 
PP PRAJA PARTY 
PSP PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY 
PWP PEASANTS & WORKERS PARTY 
RCI / RCP REVOLUTIONARY COMMUMIST PARTY OF INDIA 
RCPI(RB) REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (RASIK BHATT) 
RJD RASHTRIYA JANATA DAL 
RLD  RASHTRIYA LOK DAL 
RMP RASHTRIYA MAJDOOR PAKSHA 
RPD RASHTRIYA PARIVARTAN DAL 
RPI / REP REPUBLIC PARTY OF INDIA 
RPI(A) / RPA REPUBLICAN PARTY OF INDIA (A) / (AMBEDKARITE) 
RPK / RPI(K) REPUBLICAN PARTY OF INDIA (KHOBRAGADE GROUP) 
RRP / ARRP AKHIL BHARATIYA RAMRAJYA PARISHAD 
RSMD RASHTRIYA SAMANTA DAL 
RSNM RAJASTHAN SAMAJIK NYAYA MANCH 
RSP REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST PARTY 
RSPK(B) REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST PARTY OF KERALA (BOLSHEVIK) 
RTKP RASHTRIYA KRANTI PARTY 
SAD / AD SHIROMANI AKALI DAL 
SAD(M)  SHIROMANI AKALI DAL (SIMRANJIT SINGH MANN) 
SAP SAMATA PARTY 
SBP SANJUKTA BIPLABI PARISHA 
SHD SHOSHIT DAL 
SHS SHIVSENA 
SJP(R)  SAMAJWADI JANTA PARTY (RASHTRIYA) 
SJP(M) SAMAJWADI JANATA PARTY (MAHARASHTRA) 
SLAP / SAP SOCIAL ACTION PARTY 
SOC / SOP SOCIALIST PARTY / SAMYUKTA SOCIALIST PARTY 
SOP(L) / SLP(L) SOCIALIST PARTY (LOHIA) 
SP SAMAJWADI PARTY 
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Acronym Name 
SSD SHOSHIT SAMAJ DAL (AKHIL BHARTIYA) 
SSP SANGHATA SOCIALIST PARTY 
STBP SWATANTRA BHARAT BAKSHA 
STS SAMPURNA TELENGANA PRAJA SAMITHI 
SUC / SUCI SOCIALIST UNITY CENTRE OF INDIA 
SWA SWATANTRA PARTY 
TDP TELUGU DESAM PARTY 
TMC(M) TAMIL MAANILA CONGRESS (MOOPANAR) 
TMK THAYAKA MARUMALARCHI KAZHAGAM 
TRS TELANGANA RASHTRA SAMITHI 
UCPI UNITED COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA 
UGDP UNITED GOANS DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
UKD / UKKD UTTARAKHAND KRANTI DAL 
UMFA / UMF UNITED MINORITIES FRONT ASSAM 
UTC UTKAL CONGRESS 
VHP VISHAL HARYANA PARTY 
WBSP WEST BENGAL SOCIALIST PARTY 
WPI WORKERS PARTY OF INDIA 
YVP YUVA VIKAS PARTY 
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Appendix C: Data Sources 
 
Description of Variables and Data Source 
Variable Description Data Set Original Source 
 Outcome Variables   
Output 
measures 
Output measures are for total net state domestic product, net state 
domestic product for agricultural, non-agricultural, total 
manufacturing, registered manufacturing, and unregistered 
manufacturing activities. 
EOPP & 
World 
Bank 
Central 
Statistical 
Office 
Workers 
employed 
Workers are defined to include all persons employed directly or 
through contractors whether for wages and non-wage work in any 
manufacturing process or related maintenance work. It includes labor 
employed for generating electricity, or producing coal, gas etc.  
EOPP & 
EPWRF 
ASI 
Total 
employment 
Includes all workers as defined above and persons receiving wages 
and holding clerical or supervisory or managerial positions engaged in 
administrative office, store keeping section and welfare section, sales 
department as also those engaged in purchase of raw materials etc. or 
purchase of fixed assets for the factory as well as watch and ward 
staff. 
EOPP & 
EPWRF 
ASI 
Daily 
employment 
It is calculated by dividing the total attendance by workers employed 
(as defined above) in a year by the number of days worked by the 
factory as registered by the Factories Act, 1948. 
EOPP Indian 
Labour 
Yearbook 
Workers’ 
earnings 
Wages to workers includes direct wages and salary (basic, overtime, 
allowances, etc.), remuneration for the period not worked (paid 
holiday, lay-offs, etc. if not paid by other sources), and bonuses and 
ex-gratia payments. It does not include lay off payments which are 
made from other sources other than the employer directly, imputed 
value of benefits in kind, employer’s contribution to social security 
and old age benefits, etc. Wages are expressed in gross value before 
deduction for fines, damages, taxes, provident fund and state 
insurance contribution, etc. 
EOPP & 
EPWRF 
ASI 
Value-added It is the net value-added computed as the difference between the total 
output and the sum of total input and depreciation and denotes the 
incremental value to goods and services produced by the factory. 
EOPP & 
EPWRF 
ASI 
Factories Number of factories as covered under the Payment of Wages Act, 
1936. It tracks the net flow of firms in the registered manufacturing 
sector as it tracks deregistration of incumbent firms and new entrants. 
For the state-industry analysis number of factories is taken from the 
Annual Survey of Industries as covered under the Factories Act, 1948. 
EOPP & 
EPWRF 
 
Indian 
Labour 
Yearbook & 
ASI 
Fixed 
Capital 
Fixed capital is the depreciated value of fixed assets with more than 
one year of productive life such as lease-hold land, buildings, plant 
and machinery, furniture and fixtures, transport equipment, water 
system and roadways, and other assets such as hospitals, schools, etc. 
used for the be benefit of the factory personnel. 
EOPP & 
EPWRF 
ASI 
Investment 
flow 
Investment flow calculated as the difference between the sum of 
current fixed capital and depreciation, and fixed capital from the 
previous period as defined above. 
EPWRF ASI 
 Control Variables   
Development 
Expenditure 
Development expenditure includes expenditure on social services and 
economic services. Social services includes education, sports, art and 
culture; medical and public health, family welfare, water supply and 
sanitation, housing urban development, welfare of SCs and STs and 
OBCs; labor welfare; social security and welfare; nutrition; relief 
from natural calamities; etc. Expenditure on economic services 
includes agriculture and allied activities; rural development; special 
area programs; irrigation and flood control; energy; industry and 
minerals; transport and communications; science, technology and  
EOPP Public 
Finance 
Statistics 
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Variable Description Data Set Original Source 
 environment; and general economic services.   
Bank credit Bank credit is the total credit of scheduled commercial banks by place 
(state) of utilization. Data from 1972 to 1995 is from Banking 
Statistics 1972-1995 (Summary Tables), table number 4: State-wise 
classification of deposits and credit (credit as per place of sanction 
and place of utilization) of scheduled commercial banks. Data for the 
remaining period is from annual issues of the Banking Statistics - 
Basic Statistical Returns. Both publications are available online at 
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/publications.aspx 
N/A Reserve 
Bank of 
India 
Literacy 
Rate 
Decennial data for state-wise literacy rates where obtained from the 
Economic Survey 2007-2008 from period 1951 to 2001 and 
interpolated for the years in between. 
N/A Census of 
India 
Installed 
Electricity 
capacity 
The total installed generating electricity capacity is measured in 
thousand kilowatts and was taken from EOPP. It was updated using 
various issues of the Annual Report on The Working of State 
Electricity Boards Electricity Departments produced by Planning 
Commission (Power & Energy Division), Government of India and 
Statistical Abstracts, Central Statistical Office, Department of 
Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India. 
EOPP Planning 
Commission 
State 
Population 
State population is total of rural and urban population and recoded by 
the Census of India 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and is 
interpolated for the years in between  
EOPP & 
World 
Bank 
Census of 
India 
 Explanatory Variables   
Labor 
Regulation 
Besley and Burgess (2004) code each text amendment to the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as listed in Malik (1997) by assigning 
each amendment a score of 1, 0, and -1 for amendments favoring pro-
employer, neither employers or workers, and pro-worker respectively. 
In the case of more than one amendment for a state in a given year, 
the information is collapsed into one score as a single directional 
measure. The regulatory variable is constructed by cumulating scores 
for year for from 1947 to 1997. 
EOPP Malik 
(1997) 
Left, Right, 
Center 
Share of seats held by various parties were compiled using various 
statistical reports on general election to the legislative assembly for 
the 16 states available at 
http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp. Data 
for selected years was verified using India Butler, Lahiri and Roy 
(1989) and Chandidas et al  (1968). 
N/A Planning 
Commission 
 Industry Characteristics   
Capital 
intensity 
Measured by log of the ratio of real fixed capital stock to total 
employment and averaged over the period 1979 to 1997 
EPWRF ASI 
 Deflators   
SCPIAL1 Consumer Price Index for Agricultural laborers (CPIAL) with the 
base year 1973-74. Separate observations for Haryana and Punjab 
have been included from 1965 onwards. The series is corrected for 
interstate cost of living and rising firewood prices by Ozler, Datt, and 
Ravallion (1996). The data was organized using  the Labour 
Handbook, the Indian Labour Journal, the Indian Labour Gazette and 
the Reserve Bank of India Report on Currency and Finance. 
EOPP & 
World 
Bank 
Various 
publications 
from the 
Government 
of India 
STCPW1 Same as SPCIAL1 but using Consumer Price Index for Industrial 
Workers (CPIIW) 
EOPP  
 
EOPP: The EOPP Indian STATA data base is made available by STICERD, London School of Economics, 
at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/research/indian.asp .  
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ASI: The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) is the primacy source of industrial statistics in India. The 
survey is conducted by the Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, 
India (website:  http://mospi.nic.in/stat_act_t3.htm) 
 
EPWRF: The ASI data for this study was updated using the Annual Survey of Industries 1973-74 to 2003-
04 (Vol. II) data base purchased from the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF) 
http://www.epwrf.res.in/ 
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Appendix D: Re-coded State Amendments 
 
Amendments re-coded according to Ahsan and Pagés (2008) and Bhatthcharjea (2006) 
LR_0: Regulatory score for amendment assigned by Besley and Burgess 
LR_1: Modified score for amendment 
Net_0: Net score for all amendments for the given state and year computed by Besley and Burgess 
Net_1: Net score for all amendments for the given state and year based on LR_1 
Refer to Appendix B for state names 
State Provision Section Year LR_0 LR_1 Net_0 Net_1 
AP Any service in hospitals or dispensaries 
are classified as a public utility. 
Bhattacharjea (2006) argues that these are 
not in manufacturing and therefore 
irrelevant for the study. 
2 1968 -1 0 -1 0 
AP A labor court or tribunal is granted the 
power of a civil court to execute its award 
or any settlement as a decree of a civil 
court. Bhattacharjea (2006) argues that 
this does not need to reduce the cost of 
resolving labor disputes 
11A-
11D 
1982 -1 0 -1 0 
MP In the case of criminal cases the Labour 
Court shall have all the powers under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure of a Judicial 
Magistrate of the First Class. 
Bhattacharjea (2006) argues that this does 
not necessarily translate to a reduction in 
the cost of resolving disputes.  
11A-
11D 
1982 -1 0 -1 -1 
MP Labour court is given the power to deal 
with every offence punishable under the 
Labor Disputes Act as well as under a 
range of other central acts dealing with 
labour issues. Bhattacharjea (2006) 
argues that this does not necessarily 
translate to a reduction in the cost of 
resolving disputes. Ahsan and Pagés 
(2008) seem to have missed this. The net 
score the year 1982 remain unchanged as 
a pro-employer amendment was made to 
section 7 and a neutral amendment to 
section 10, all in the same year. 
34 1982 -1 0 -1 -1 
MP (i) Undertakings dealing with 
construction of building, bridges, roads, 
canals, dams or other construction work 
are no longer exempted from procedures 
for closing down undertakings. 
Bhattacharjea (2006) states that 
manufacturing does not concern these 
undertakings. 
25O 1983 1 0 1 0 
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State Provision Section Year LR_0 LR_1 Net_0 Net_1 
MH The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and 
closure may according to the discretion 
of the state government be applied to 
industrial establishments, which employ 
more than 100 workers. Under the central 
act theses rules only apply to 
establishments, which more than 300 
workers. Bhattacharjea (2006) questions 
this on the bases that the same change 
was adopted at the National level through 
a central amendment to the IDA one year 
later. Ahsan and Pagés (2008) think it 
best to leave it unchanged to reflect that 
it changed one year ahead of the central 
code. We agree with them but make the 
amendment neutral for the year 1982 to 
reflect that the central amendment would 
affect all states and not render the state of 
Maharashtra any more pro-worker than 
the rest with regards to this amendment. 
The net score for 1981 remains +1 due to 
other pro-worker amendments made to 
sections 2 and 25C in the same year. The 
cumulative score for 1982 remains 
unchanged as well. 
25K 1981 1 1 1 1 
OR The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and 
closure may according to the discretion 
of the state government be applied to 
industrial establishments, which employ 
more than 100 workers. Under the central 
act these rules only apply to 
establishments, which employ more than 
300 workers. Bhattacharjea (2006) 
argues that the same change was adopted 
at the National level through a central 
amendment to the IDA one year earlier in 
1982 therefore nullifying the state 
amendment.  The net score for 1983 is 
unchanged as a pro-worker amendment 
was passed for section 25O. Ahsan and 
Pagés (2008) either make a mistake or 
have a typo as the net score for their 
employment protection index is changed 
to 0. 
1983 25K 1 0 1 1 
 57 
 
State Provision Section Year LR_0 LR_1 Net_0 Net_1 
RJ The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and 
closure may according to the discretion 
of the state government be applied to 
industrial establishments, which employ 
more than 100 workers. Under the 
central act these rules only apply to 
establishments, which employ more than 
300 workers. Bhattacharjea (2006) 
argues that the same change was adopted 
at the National level through a central 
amendment to the IDA two years earlier 
in 1982 therefore nullifying the state 
amendment.  The net score for 1984 is 
unchanged as 4 pro-worker amendments 
were passed for sections 25N, 25O, 25Q, 
and 25S with only 1 pro-employer 
amendment to section 25M and 6 neutral 
amendments to subsections L, M, N, P, 
PP, and R of section 25. 
1984 25K 1 0 1 1 
RJ The definition of employer in the context 
of an industrial dispute also includes 
owners who have contracted with 
persons for the execution of work as part 
of the industry. The definition of worker 
in the context of an industrial dispute 
also includes workers who have 
contracted with employers for the 
execution of work as part of the industry. 
Bhattacharjea (2006) argues that these 
two changes are “different sides of the 
same coin”. Ahsan and Pagés (2008) 
seem to have missed this. We give a 
score of +1 for both these definitions in 
section 2 instead of +1 for each as have 
Besley and Burgess. The net score 
however does not change. 
1960 2 1 1 -1 -1 
RJ Registrar is defined as the person 
appointed to be the Registrar of Unions. 
This makes it clear who is involved in 
the bargaining process on behalf of the 
unions. This definition does not appear 
in the central act and hence might be 
subject to interpretation. Bhattacharjea 
(2006) argues that the amendment does 
not indicate that the officials appointed 
are supposed to represent unions. The 
net score for the year does not change as 
we now have 3 pro-employer 
amendments in sections 2 and 3, 1 pro-
worker amendment in section 2, and 3 
neutral amendments in section 2, all in 
the same year. 
1960 2 -1 0 -1 -1 
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Figures and Tables  
 
Table 1: Industrial Labor Laws 
Legislation Aim Coverage Enacted by 
I. Industrial Laws 
Industrial Disputes Act, 
1947 
Provides machinery and procedures 
for the investigation and settlement of 
industrial disputes 
All existing industries in India CIRM and 
State 
Governments 
Trade Unions Act, 1926 Seeks to confer a legal and corporate 
status on registered trade unions. 
Provides immunity from civil and 
criminal liability for members and 
executives engaged in bona fide trade 
union activities. 
Whole of India  
Industrial (Regulation 
and Development) Act, 
1952 
  Central 
Government 
II. Wage Laws 
Minimum Wages Act, 
1948 
Fixes minimum wage rates in 
scheduled employments with period 
revisions. 
Whole of India with allowing central 
and state governments to extent the 
application to other employments  
Central and State 
Governments 
Payment of Wages Act, 
1936 
Ensures regular and prompt payment 
of wages and prohibits arbitrary fines 
and deductions from wages 
Whole of India. Primarily 
manufacturing establishments using 
power and 10 or more employees or 
20 or more employees without 
power. Employees defined as not 
earning more than Rs1,600 a month 
State 
Governments, 
except for 
railways, mines, 
oilfields, and Air 
Transport 
Services (ATS) 
Payment of Bonus Act, 
1965 
Provides for the payment of bonuses 
to persons employed in certain 
establishments and for the matters 
connected therewith 
Whole of India. Employees defined 
as earning not more than Rs6,500 a 
month 
 
Equal Remuneration 
Act, 1976 
Equal remuneration to prevent  
discrimination based on sex and 
prevent exploitation of women 
Whole of India  
III. Welfare and Working Conditions 
Factories Act, 1948 Safety measures and to promote 
health of workers and child labor 
Whole of India and all 
manufacturing establishments 
employing 10 or more workers using 
power or 20 or more without use of 
power 
State 
Governments 
Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act, 
1946 
Regulates the conditions of 
recruitment, discharge, dismissal, 
disciplinary action, holidays, and 
working conditions of workers 
Industrial establishments with 100 or 
more workers and extends to whole 
of India  
 
Contract Labour 
(Regulation and 
Abolition) Act, 1970 
Regulates the employment of contract 
labor in certain establishments and 
abolition to encourage direct 
employment 
Whole of India and applies to (i) 
every establishment in which 20 or 
more workmen are employed or 
were employed as contract on any 
day of the preceding 12 months, and 
(ii) every contractor who employs or 
employed 20 or more workmen on 
any day of the preceding 12 months. 
CIRM and State 
Governments 
Shops and Commercial 
Establishments Act 
Regulate the conditions of work of 
employees engaged in shops and 
commercial establishments.  
Covers shops and commercial 
establishments, restaurants, hotels, 
and places of amusement in certain 
notified urban areas. 
State 
Governments 
IV. Social Security Laws 
Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, 
1923 
Requires employers to pay 
compensation to their workers for 
accidental injury caused to the 
workers arising out of an in the 
Whole of India and to certain 
categories of railway servants and 
workers employed in any capacity 
specified in schedule II of the act 
State 
Governments 
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course of employment resulting in 
death or in total/partial disablement. 
(factories, mines, plantations, 
mechanically propelled vehicles, 
construction work, and certain other 
hazardous occupations). 
Employees’ State 
Insurance Act, 1948 
Provides for certain benefits to 
employees in case of sickness, 
maternity, and employment injury, 
and other related matters. 
Extends to the whole of India except 
the state of Sikkim and applies to all 
factories employing 10 or more 
workers using power or 20 or more 
without using power, and services 
like shops and hotels employing 20 
or more workers. Coverage is 
restricted to persons with not more 
than Rs6,500 
State 
Governments 
and the 
Autonomous 
Agencies 
created by the 
statutes. 
Employees’ Provident 
Funds and 
Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act, 1952 
Provides for the setting up of 
compulsory provident funds for 
employees in factories and other 
establishments 
Extends to the whole of India expect 
the state of Jammu & Kashmir 
(J&K) and extends to all factories 
and other establishments of any 
notified industry that employ 20 or 
more workers. The wage ceiling for 
coverage under the provident fund 
scheme is Rs6,500 per month.  
 
Maternity Benefit Act, 
1961 
Regulation of employment of women 
in certain establishments for certain 
periods before and after childbirth 
and provides for maternity benefits 
and certain other benefits. 
Extends to the whole of India and 
applies to every factory, mine and 
plantation , expect the factories and 
establishments to which provisions 
of the Employees’ State Insurance 
Act, 1948, are applicable. 
 
Employees’ Pension 
Scheme, 1995 
Provides for the payment of monthly 
pensions in case of contingencies like 
superannuation, retirement, 
permanent total disablement, or death 
during service. 
Extends to all persons who were 
members of the Family Pension 
Scheme, 1971. It is compulsory for 
persons who became members of the 
provident fund after 16 November 
1995 
 
Payment of Gratuity 
Act, 1972 
Provides for the payment of gratuity 
to employees in factories and 
establishments. 
Extends to the whole of India except 
the state of Sikkim and plantations in 
the state of Jammu & Kashmir. 
Applies to every factory, mine, oil 
field, plantation, port, oil company, 
and shop or establishment in which 
10 or more workers are employed or 
were employed on any day of the 
preceding 12 months. There is no 
wage ceiling for coverage under the 
act. The maximum amount 
obtainable under the act is 
Rs350,000 per employee. 
 
Source: Anant et al (2006), Jha & Golder (2008), Malik (2007), Planning Commission (2001) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: 1970 – 1997 
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min Max 
      
Explanatory Variables 
Labor Regulation 448 -0.065 1.094 -2 4 
Left 448 0.101 0.193 0 0.830 
      
Control Variables 
Log (real) development expenditure per capita 448 4.827 0.508 3.295 6.010 
Log installed electricity capacity per capita 448 3.718 0.632 1.170 5.067 
Literacy rates 446 0.461 0.147 0.208 0.904 
Log total population 448 17.369 0.730 15.315 18.883 
Log (real) credit per capita 416 5.296 0.802 2.997 6.903 
 
Outcome Variables 
(Real) Output 448 7.047 0.363 6.186 8.039 
Log output (all sectors) per capita 447 6.107 0.329 5.214 7.172 
Log agricultural output per capita 447 6.501 0.476 5.272 7.574 
Log non-agricultural output per capita 447 5.018 0.620 3.670 6.599 
Log total manufacturing output per capita  447 4.491 0.759 2.172 6.353 
Log registered manufacturing output per capita 447 4.030 0.580 2.547 5.455 
Log unregistered manufacturing output per capita 448 7.047 0.363 6.186 8.039 
      
Employment and wages in formal manufacturing 
Log workers employed per capita 432 -4.940 0.584 -6.583 -4.010 
Log total employment  432 -4.689 0.575 -6.329 -3.799 
Log daily employment 364 11.524 1.230 6.908 13.812 
Log earnings per worker 432 8.379 0.345 7.098 9.361 
Log income to workers as a share of value-added 432 -1.267 0.348 -2.199 1.053 
      
Productivity and Investment in formal manufacturing 
Log real value-added per employee 432 9.394 0.473 6.845 10.925 
Log fixed capital per capita 432 5.723 0.681 3.313 7.594 
Investment per capita 415 81.444 92.352 150.0 1136.3 
Log factories per capita 364 -9.175 0.862 -11.339 -6.987 
Log workers per factory 348 4.265 0.626 1.966 6.589 
      
Data listed is for 16 states. Appendix C lists the description of variables and data sources. 
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Table 3: Left presence in Legislature Assemblies, Classification of States, and Labor market Flexibility: 1958 - 2002  
Left Besley & Burgess (2004)  
State Mean s.d. Min Max Mean s.d. Min Max Classification 
Goswami et al (2002) Hasan et al (2007) 
Andhra Pradesh 0.0721 0.0494 0.0068 0.1700 -1.89 0.57 -3 -1 Business Good Flexible 
Assam  0.0520 0.0451 0.0095 0.1587 0 0 0 0 Neutral --- Rigid 
Bihar  0.1190 0.1124 0.0220 0.4259 0 0 0 0 Neutral --- Rigid 
Gujarat  0.0004 0.0015 0 0.0060 0.67 0.48 0 1 Worker Best Flexible 
Haryana 0.0058 0.0083 0 0.0247 0 0 0 0 Neutral --- Rigid 
Jammu & Kashmir 0.0032 0.0068 0 0.0230 0 0 0 0 Neutral --- --- 
Karnataka 0.0124 0.0086 0 0.0268 -0.33 0.48 -1 0 Business Good Flexible 
Kerala 0.4415 0.0961 0.2302 0.5714 -0.53 0.50 -1 0 Business Poor Rigid 
Madhya Pradesh 0.0058 0.0042 0 0.0125 -0.02 0.15 -1 0 Business --- Rigid 
Maharashtra  0.0638 0.0312 0.0243 0.1296 0.93 0.99 0 2 Worker Best Flexible 
Orissa 0.0307 0.0206 0.0068 0.0685 0.44 0.50 0 1 Worker --- Rigid 
Punjab  0.0632 0.0416 0.0085 0.1282 0 0 0 0 Neutral Medium Rigid 
Rajasthan 0.0108 0.0080 0.0050 0.0284 -1.27 0.54 -2 0 Business --- Flexible 
Tamil Nadu 0.0571 0.0339 0.0128 0.1368 -1.47 0.50 -2 -1 Business Good Flexible 
Uttar Pradesh 0.0230 0.0153 0.0042 0.0565 0 0 0 0 Neutral Poor Rigid 
West Bengal  0.5715 0.2558 0.1929 0.8299 1.84 1.71 0 4 Business Poor Rigid 
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Table 4: Coefficient of Variation in share of seats won by Left parties in the State Legislature 
 1960 -2004 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2004 
Panel A: Besley and Burgess (2004) 
Pro-worker       
Maharashtra  48.9 19.0 44.5 10.2 21.3 22. 9 
Orissa 67.7 38.8 53.1 63.3 75.3 70.7 
West Bengal  42.5 32.9 63.2 2.7 9.1 8.7 
Average 53.0 30.2 53.6 25.4 35.3 34.1 
       
Neutral       
Assam  87.2 74.4 92.2 110.6 27.7 80.1 
Bihar  91.6 61.1 14.2 38.3 2.7 86.3 
Haryana 144.5 43.3 210.8 161.0 316.2 148.1 
Punjab  67.7 27.5 25.2 91.4 66.7 98.4 
Uttar Pradesh 67.6 39.3 51.7 3.9 28.0 38.0 
Average 91.7 49.1 78.8 81.1 88.3 90.2 
       
Pro-business       
Andhra Pradesh 70.4 33.5 46.1 33.0 54.1 66.2 
Karnataka 70.7 25.6 11.4 38.9 105.4 111.9 
Kerala 22.3 43.1 2.6 10.4 16.9 15.9 
Madhya Pradesh 74.3 35.8 83.4 105.4 38.6 74.2 
Rajasthan 73.3 71.0 49.1 35.1 35.0 34.2 
Tamil Nadu 59.0 44.1 9.8 52.0 71.2 67.4 
Average 61.7 42.2 33.7 45.8 53.5 61.6 
       
Panel B: Besley and Burgess (2004) and World Bank (2002) 
Pro-worker (average) 44.1 38.3 39.6 25.5 33.8 31.8 
Neutral (average) 91.7 49.1 78.8 81.1 88.3 90.2 
Pro-business (average) 66.1 38.2 40.7 45.8 54.3 62.8 
Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir are omitted due to zero Left seats for most decades 
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Table 5: Manufacturing Output and Center and Right Political Orientation of the State Assemblies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log registered 
manufacturing output 
[1970-1997] 
Log registered 
manufacturing output 
[1970-1997] 
Log registered 
manufacturing output 
[1970-1997] 
Log registered 
manufacturing output 
[1970-1997] 
Log registered 
manufacturing output 
[1974-1997] 
Log registered 
manufacturing output 
[1974-1997] 
-0.168** -0.164*** -0.208** -0.196*** -0.143** -0.178** Labor regulation [t-1] 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
-0.052 -0.083   -0.064  Right [t-1] 
(0.09) (0.07)   (0.06)  
0.176* 0.143*   0.144**  Labor regulation [t-1] * 
Right [t-1] (0.10) (0.07)   (0.06)  
  0.098 0.105  0.078 Center [t-1] 
  (0.12) (0.09)  (0.08) 
  0.156* 0.136*  0.134 Labor regulation [t-1] * 
Center [t-1]   (0.08) (0.07)  (0.08) 
Observations 447 445 447 445 383 383 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.65 0.65 
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors are clustered by state and presented in parenthesis. Registered manufacturing 
output is measured in real terms.  
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Table 6: Pair-wise correlations among control variables  
  
Development 
Expenditure 
Installed 
Electricity 
Capacity 
Literacy Population Credit 
Development Expenditure 1      
Installed Electricity Capacity 0.7461*** 1     
Literacy 0.6656*** 0.6699*** 1    
Population -0.0463 0.1557*** 0.1944*** 1  
Credit 0.7386*** 0.8068*** 0.7138*** 0.027 1 
*** significant at 1%           
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Difference in Means of Control Variables: 1970 - 1997 
Development Expenditure 
H0 = 4.829 
HA ≠ 4.829 
Literacy Rates 
H0 = 0.461 
HA ≠ 0.461 
Electricity Capacity 
H0 = 3.716 
HA ≠ 3.716 
State Population 
H0 = 17.374 
HA ≠ 17.374 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
States grouped by 
percentile of 
share of seats held 
by the left 
Mean t-stat Pr(|T| > |t|) Mean t-stat Pr(|T| > |t|) Mean t-stat Pr(|T| > |t|) Mean t-stat Pr(|T| > |t|) 
25%: Low 
GJ,HR,JK,MP 
5.046 4.311 0.000 0.421 -3.688 0.000 3.877 2.624 0.010 16.824 -6.745 0.000 
50%: Low-Medium 
KA,OR,RJ,TN 
4.809 -0.488 0.626 0.445 -1.390 0.167 3.746 0.822 0.413 17.427 2.081 0.040 
75%: Medium 
AP,AS,MH, UP 
4.749 -1.786 0.077 0.443 -1.562 0.121 3.577 -2.273 0.025 17.796 6.521 0.000 
99%: High 
BH,KE,PJ,WB 
4.703 -2.578 0.011 0.535 4.059 0.000 3.670 -0.657 0.512 17.430 0.976 0.331 
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Table 8: Output and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation (without Controls): 1970 – 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Log state output 
per capita 
Log state 
agricultural output 
per capita 
Log nonagricultural 
output per capita 
Log total 
manufacturing output 
per capita 
Log registered 
manufacturing output 
per capita 
Log unregistered 
manufacturing output per 
capita 
Panel A 
-0.004 0.013 -0.028 -0.065* -0.146** 0.076** Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
Observations 496 447 447 447 447 447 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.46 0.91 0.71 0.7 0.46 
Controls No No No No No No 
Panel B 
-0.279* -0.193 -0.251*** -0.475*** -0.941*** 0.35 Left [t] 
(0.15) (0.13) (0.06) (0.14) (0.25) (0.25) 
Observations 496 447 447 447 447 447 
R2 0.88 0.46 0.91 0.71 0.68 0.45 
Controls No No No No No No 
Panel C 
0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.008 -0.032 0.06 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
-0.318 -0.397*** -0.061 -0.078 -0.069 0.082 Left [t] 
(0.2) (0.13) (0.14) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
0.011 0.069 -0.073 -0.134* -0.278*** 0.029 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Observations 496 447 447 447 447 447 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.47 0.91 0.72 0.73 0.46 
Controls No No No No No No 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. All results include state fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and shown in parenthesis.  
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Table 9: Output and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation (with Controls): 1970 – 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Log state output 
per capita 
Log state 
agricultural output 
per capita 
Log nonagricultural 
output per capita 
Log total 
manufacturing output 
per capita 
Log registered 
manufacturing output 
per capita 
Log unregistered 
manufacturing output per 
capita 
Panel A 
0.02 0.023 -0.009 -0.049 -0.145** 0.098** Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Observations 494 445 445 445 445 445 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.47 0.93 0.76 0.72 0.53 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B 
-0.133 -0.158 -0.123 -0.323** -0.807*** 0.486** Left [t] 
(0.1) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.23) (0.22) 
Observations 494 445 445 445 445 445 
R2 0.91 0.47 0.93 0.76 0.7 0.51 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C 
0.032 0.013 0.02 -0.004 -0.049 0.075 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
-0.183* -0.370*** 0.023 -0.012 -0.043 0.172 Left [t] 
(0.1) (0.12) (0.07) (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) 
-0.012 0.065 -0.075** -0.112* -0.233*** 0.038 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Observations 494 445 445 445 445 445 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.48 0.93 0.76 0.74 0.53 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. All results include state fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 10: Employment, Wages, and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation (without Controls): 1970 – 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Log of workers 
employed  per capita 
Log total employment 
per capita 
Log daily 
employment 
Log earnings per 
worker 
Log share of income to 
workers 
Panel A 
-0.119*** -0.114** -0.462** -0.005 0.04 Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.21) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 512 512 364 480 528 
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.84 0.49 
Controls No No No No No 
Panel B 
-0.847*** -0.813*** -2.176*** 0.121 0.112 Left [t] 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.43) (0.12) (0.22) 
Observations 512 512 364 480 528 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.84 0.48 
Controls No No No No No 
Panel C 
-0.08 -0.071 -0.067 0.013 0.011 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) 
-0.578 -0.54 2.203*** 0.248** -0.05 Left [t] 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.31) (0.11) (0.26) 
-0.055 -0.066 -1.439*** -0.068 0.076 Labor Regulation [t-1] * Left [t] 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.04) (0.05) 
Observations 512 512 364 480 528 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.84 0.49 
Controls No No No No No 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. All results include state fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 11: Employment, Wages, and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation (with Controls): 1970 – 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Log of workers 
employed  per capita 
Log total employment 
per capita 
Log daily 
employment 
Log earnings per 
worker 
Log share of income to 
workers 
Panel A 
-0.087** -0.084** -0.471** -0.014 0.049** Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 478 478 362 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.4 0.4 0.31 0.84 0.46 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B 
-0.477** -0.450*** -2.007*** 0.046 0.158 Left [t] 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.38) (0.1) (0.17) 
Observations 478 478 362 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.36 0.19 0.84 0.45 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C 
-0.052 -0.048 -0.085 0.006 0.027 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) 
-0.205 -0.171 2.177*** 0.175* -0.029 Left [t] 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.28) (0.09) (0.22) 
-0.073 -0.08 -1.388*** -0.064 0.058 Labor Regulation [t-1] * Left [t] 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.04) (0.05) 
Observations 478 478 362 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.84 0.46 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. All results include state fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state and shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 12: Investment, Productivity, and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation (without Controls): 1970 – 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Log value-added per 
employee 
Log fixed capital per 
capita Investment per capita Log factories per capita Log workers per factory 
Panel A 
-0.047 -0.002 -1.474 -0.196 0.099 Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.03) (0.04) (5.47) (0.12) (0.1) 
Observations 480 480 463 364 348 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.46 0.18 0.52 0.46 
Controls No No No No No 
Panel B 
-0.048 -0.194 -29.042 -1.164*** 0.511 Left [t] 
(0.28) (0.2) (36.75) (0.3) (0.38) 
Observations 480 480 463 364 348 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.46 0.18 0.5 0.45 
Controls No No No No No 
Panel C 
-0.002 -0.001 0.019 0.005 -0.051 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.02) (0.07) (8.55) (0.1) (0.1) 
0.285 -0.232 -24.801 0.807*** -0.949*** Left [t] 
(0.26) (0.28) (49.25) (0.18) (0.29) 
-0.141** 0.018 -1.996 -0.686*** 0.557*** Labor Regulation [t-1] * Left [t] 
(0.05) (0.11) (14.84) (0.14) (0.14) 
Observations 480 480 463 364 348 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.46 0.17 0.59 0.51 
Controls No No No No No 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
state and shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 13: Investment, Productivity, and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation (with controls): 1970 – 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Log value-added per 
employee 
Log fixed capital per 
capita Investment per capita Log factories per capita Log workers per factory 
Panel A 
-0.066** 0.049 1.09 -0.213* 0.121 Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.02) (0.05) (4.47) (0.11) (0.1) 
Observations 478 478 461 362 346 
Adjusted R2 0.8 0.52 0.19 0.52 0.48 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B 
-0.139 0.206 5.026 -1.170*** 0.679* Left [t] 
(0.23) (0.26) (37.79) (0.3) (0.35) 
Observations 478 478 461 362 346 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.52 0.19 0.49 0.47 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C 
-0.026 0.052 1.306 -0.009 -0.053 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.02) (0.07) (8.19) (0.1) (0.09) 
0.171 0.135 4.323 0.795*** -0.888*** Left [t] 
(0.23) (0.35) (41.72) (0.13) (0.21) 
-0.116*** -0.018 -0.83 -0.684*** 0.610*** Labor Regulation [t-1] * Left [t] 
(0.04) (0.11) (12.28) (0.14) (0.15) 
Observations 478 478 461 362 346 
Adjusted R2 0.8 0.52 0.18 0.59 0.54 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
state and shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 14: Economic Outcome, Labor Regulation, and Share of Seats Won by Left and Center Parties: 1970-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
State output Agricultural output 
Nonagricultural 
output 
Manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output 
Unregistered 
manufacturing 
output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employment 
0.059 0.008 0.022 0.025 -0.02 0.117 -0.083 -0.067 Labor Regulation [t-1] (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) (0.05) 
-0.145 -0.265* 0.055 0.085 0.082 0.178 -0.08 -0.082 Left [t] (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.2) (0.24) (0.27) (0.18) (0.18) 
0.048 0.088** 0.029 0.098 0.123 0.026 0.096 0.07 Center [t] (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.17) (0.07) (0.06) 
-0.039 0.062 -0.080** -0.146** -0.269*** 0 -0.056 -0.07 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.1) (0.06) (0.06) 
-0.039 0.016 -0.001 -0.036 -0.032 -0.062 0.057 0.037 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Center [t] (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 494 445 445 445 445 445 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.49 0.93 0.77 0.74 0.53 0.42 0.41 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Daily 
Employment 
Workers’ 
Wages Income Share 
Value-Added 
per Employee Fixed Capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
-0.279 -0.013 -0.023 -0.005 0.14 18.335 -0.008 -0.071 
Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.17) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (28.38) (0.15) (0.16) 
2.565*** 0.269*** 0.138 0.133 -0.066 -44.876 0.649*** -0.596** Left [t] (0.23) (0.09) (0.25) (0.24) (0.42) (66.39) (0.18) (0.21) 
0.233 0.075* 0.125 -0.024 -0.135 -34.337 -0.134 0.253** Center [t] (0.15) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (35.79) (0.15) (0.12) 
-1.235*** -0.056 0.089 -0.130** -0.079 -11.97 -0.676*** 0.608*** Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.2) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (28.72) (0.17) (0.17) 
0.302** 0.035 0.089 -0.034 -0.15 -29.47 -0.008 0.04 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Center [t] (0.14) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (36.77) (0.12) (0.14) 
Observations 362 478 478 478 478 461 362 346 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.85 0.46 0.8 0.52 0.19 0.59 0.54 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls.  Standard 
errors are clustered by state and shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 15: Manufacturing Outcome and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation: State-Industry 
Variation 1970 – 1997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Registered 
Manufacturing 
Output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employed 
Earnings per 
Worker 
Income to 
Workers 
Panel A 
0.045*** -0.024 -0.03 0.005 0.014 Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.580*** -0.151 -0.174 0.222*** -0.155 Left [t] 
(0.11) (0.21) (0.2) (0.08) (0.33) 
-0.397*** -0.121** -0.115** -0.068*** 0.001 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Observations 6461 5963 5964 5960 5836 
Adjusted R2 0.6 0.18 0.17 0.37 0.01 
Controls No No No No No 
Panel B 
0.051*** -0.011 -0.019 -0.004 0.016 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
-0.253*** 0.16 0.131 0.230*** -0.195 Left [t] 
(0.09) (0.2) (0.19) (0.08) (0.34) 
-0.353*** -0.101* -0.093* -0.041 -0.021 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Observations 6461 5963 5964 5960 5836 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.19 0.18 0.37 0.066 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state-industry 
fixed effects and time fixed effects. We allow for industry time trends. Standard errors are clustered by state-industry 
and are shown in parenthesis. Panel B results include election dummies. 
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 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Value-added per 
employee  Fixed capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
Panel A 
-0.001 -0.033 0.009 -0.028 0.004 Labor Regulation [t-1] 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.36) (0.03) (0.02) 
0.409 0.101 -3.485 -0.105 -0.045 Left [t] 
(0.33) (0.33) (2.49) (0.22) (0.22) 
-0.078* -0.02 -0.394 -0.044 -0.077* Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.05) (0.07) (0.75) (0.04) (0.04) 
Observations 5837 5966 5838 5967 5963 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.23 0.01 0.22 0.18 
Controls No No No No No 
Panel B 
-0.009 -0.033 0.052 -0.008 -0.004 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.37) (0.02) (0.02) 
0.467 0.612* -1.482 0.22 -0.058 Left [t] 
(0.33) (0.32) (2.66) (0.21) (0.22) 
-0.031 0.047 -0.471 -0.032 -0.069 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.81) (0.05) (0.04) 
Observations 5837 5966 5838 5967 5963 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.25 0.0094 0.24 0.18 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state-industry 
fixed effects and time fixed effects. We allow for industry time trends. Standard errors are clustered by state-industry 
and are shown in parenthesis. Panel B results include election dummies. 
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Table 16: Manufacturing Outcome, Effectiveness of Labor Regulation, and Capital Intensity: State-Industry Variation 1970 – 1997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Registered 
Manufacturing 
Output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employed 
Earnings 
per Worker 
Income to 
Workers 
Value-
added per 
employee 
 Fixed 
capital Investment Factories 
Workers 
per Factory 
0.045 -0.434 -0.32 0.25 -0.024 0.115 -0.903* 2.859 -0.233 -0.489 Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.15) (0.42) (0.4) (0.17) (0.31) (0.33) (0.52) (6.89) (0.96) (0.4) 
-0.14 -2.375 -2.925 1.067 5.95 -5.015 -1.977 48.508 -8.222 -4.652 
Left [t] 
(1.22) (3.77) (3.57) (1.02) (4.94) (4.71) (5.16) (36.69) (6.54) (3.24) 
-0.345* 0.705 0.556 -0.043 0.231 -0.048 0.925 -10.641 1.608 1.261** Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.19) (0.76) (0.74) (0.29) (0.53) (0.52) (0.85) (12.84) (1.82) (0.54) 
0.001 0.043 0.031 -0.026 0.004 -0.013 0.089* -0.287 0.018 0.049 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Capital Intensity (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.73) (0.1) (0.04) 
-0.012 0.259 0.313 -0.086 -0.63 0.562 0.265 -5.115 0.895 0.499 Left [t] * Capital 
Intensity (0.13) (0.4) (0.37) (0.1) (0.53) (0.51) (0.54) (3.91) (0.67) (0.34) 
-0.001 -0.082 -0.066 0 -0.026 0.002 -0.09 1.039 -0.16 -0.132** Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] * Capital 
Intensity (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (1.38) (0.19) (0.05) 
Observations 6461 5963 5964 5960 5836 5837 5966 5838 4005 5967 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.19 0.19 0.37 0.067 0.19 0.25 0.0091 0.13 0.24 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state-industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, controls, and election 
dummies. We also allow for industry time trends. Standard errors are clustered by state-industry and are shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 17: Capital Intensity of Industries: India 1979-1997 
Capital 
Intensity 
Rank Description 
NIC-1987 
2 Digit 
ln of Capital 
Intensity 
% change 
in factory 
size 
1 Electricity 40 11.822 9.94 
2 Gas and Steam Generation and Distribution 
Through Pipes 41 11.101 7.07 
3 Manufacture of Basic Chemicals and 
Chemical Products (Except Products of 
Petroleum and Coal) 30 10.992 6.64 
4 Manufacture of Rubber, Plastic, Petroleum 
and Coal Products; Processing of Nuclear 
Fuels 31 10.754 5.71 
5 Basic Metal and Alloys Industries 33 10.717 5.57 
6 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 
and Printing, Publishing & Allied Industries 28 10.122 3.29 
7 Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products 32 9.964 2.69 
8 Manufacture of Wool, Silk and Man-made 
Fiber Textiles 24 9.915 2.51 
9 Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment 
other than Transport Equipment (and excl. 
Manufacture of Scientific Equipment, 
Photographic / Cinematographic Equipment 
and Watches & Clocks) 35-36 9.901 2.45 
10 Water Works and Supply 42 9.859 2.30 
11 Manufacture of Transport Equipment and 
Parts 37 9.744 1.87 
12 Other Manufacturing Industries (incl. 
Manufacture of Scientific Equipment, 
Photographic / Cinematographic Equipment 
and Watches & Clocks) 38 9.599 1.33 
13 Manufacture of Metal Products and parts, 
except machinery and Equipment 34 9.386 0.54 
14 Manufacture of Food and other Food 
Products 20-21 9.317 0.28 
15 Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products, 
Fur & Leather Substitutes 29 9.268 0.11 
16 Manufacture of Cotton Textiles 23 9.266 0.09 
17 Manufacture of Beverages, Tobacco and 
Related Products 22 9.108 -0.48 
18 Manufacture of Textile Products (including 
wearing apparel) 26 8.996 -0.89 
19 Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products: 
Furniture and Fixtures 27 8.979 -0.95 
20 Manufacture of Jute and Other Vegetable 
Fiber Textiles (except Cotton) 25 8.592 -2.35 
21 Repair of Capital Goods 39 8.369 -3.14 
 Mean  9.799 2.07 
Using the coefficients from column (10) of table 15 we compute the % change in factory size as:  
-4.652(ΔLeft) + 1.261(R * ΔLeft) + 0.499(ΔLeft * Zi) - 0.132(R * ΔLeft * Zi) ] -1 }*100, where ΔLeft is 
taken to be a 10 percentage point increase in share of seats held by left parties, R is taken as a cumulative 
pro-worker amendment of +1, and Zi is ln of the capital intensity in industry i. 
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Table 18: Linearity of Labor Regulation and Left 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Labor 
Regulation 
[1970-1997] 
Labor 
Regulation 
[1970-1997] 
[without WB] 
Labor 
Regulation 
[1977-1997] 
Labor 
Regulation 
[1970-1997] 
Labor 
Regulation 
[1970-1997] 
[without WB] 
Labor 
Regulation 
[1977-1997] 
Share of left seats 3.112*** -0.217 0.664 3.268*** -0.287 1.011 
 (0.54) (1.21) (0.77) (0.54) (1.06) (0.85) 
Observations  446 418 336 446 418 336 
R2 0.22 0.034 0.076 0.21 0.045 0.057 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. Specification 
includes state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls. Estimates are significant at the 10 percent level even when excluding 
controls. Standard errors are clustered by state and shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 19: Robustness – Test for Single Outlier States: 1970-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome Labor Regulation [t-1] Left 
Labor Regulation  
[t-1] * Left 
Output 
-0.026 to 0.028 -0.610*** to -0.117 -0.115 to 0.050 1 State output 
 AP, KE  
-0.042* to 0.018 -0.615*** to -0.348*** 0.048 to 0.122*** 2 Agriculture 
MH All MH 
-0.015 to 0.027 -0.259 to 0.033 -0.101* to 0.043 3 Non-Agriculture 
  BH, JK, KA, MH, TN, UP 
-0.022 to 0.038 -0.497 to 0.074 -0.191** to -0.001 4 Manufacturing 
  All except AP, UP, WB 
-0.048 to 0.043 -0.357 to -0.031 -0.307*** to -0.081 5a Registered Manufacturing 
  All except WB 
0.005 to 0.115 -1.188  to -0.187  -0.342*** to -1.503* 5b Registered Manufacturing 
[1980-1997]   All 
0.034 to 0.097** -0.442 to 0.187 -0.023 to 0.08 6 Unregistered 
Manufacturing RJ   
Employment and Wages 
-0.102** to -0.033 -0.982*** to -0.385 -0.115 to 0.145 7 Workers Employed 
RJ WB  
-0.090** to -0.034 -0.970** to -0.32 -0.114 to 0.141 8 Total Employment 
JK, KE, RJ WB  
-0.108 to 0.100 1.269** to 2.379*** -1.646*** to -1.379*** 9 Daily Employment 
 All All 
-0.009 to 0.03 0.185 to 0.327* -0.301*** -0.094** 10 Workers’ Earnings 
 All except UP OR, WB 
-0.01 to 0.026 -0.213 to 0.194 -0.305** to 0.100** 11 Workers' Share of Income 
  AS, BH, HR, KA, MP > 0 ; WB < 0 
Investment and Productivity 
-0.024 to 0.006 0.018 to 0.420* -0.160*** to -0.029 12 Value-Added per 
Employee  AS All except WB 
-0.046 to 0.035 -0.433 to -0.042 -0.029 to 0.361 13 Fixed Capital 
   
-5.713 to 5.455 -68.049 to -4.662 -7.754 to 82.918 14 Investment 
   
-0.049 to 0.096 0.269 to 0.850*** -1.554*** to -0.603*** 15 Factories 
 All except WB All 
-0.128 to -0.004 -1.101*** to -0.197 0.490*** to 2.089*** 16 Workers per Factory 
 All except WB All 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Specification includes state and 
time fixed effects but no controls. Only maximum and minimum estimates are shown along with a list of states, 
which if individually excluded from the sample, yield significant estimates. Each line corresponds to a separate 
regression. Results are similar on including controls. Standard errors are not reported. 
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Table 20: Robustness – Test for Kerala and West Bengal as Outlier States: 1970-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Agricultural 
output 
Nonagricultural 
output 
Manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output  
[1977-1997] 
Unregistered 
manufacturing 
output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employment 
Labor Regulation [t-1] -0.003 0.025 0.018 -0.024 0.029 0.092 -0.049 -0.049 
Left [t] -0.622*** -0.027 -0.335 -0.616 -0.688 0.13 -0.544* -0.521* 
Labor Regulation [t-1] 
* Left [t] 0.516 -0.353 -1.055* -1.263 -1.219* -0.722 -0.504 -0.325 
Observations 389 389 389 389 293 389 418 418 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.93 0.77 0.74 0.61 0.49 0.38 0.37 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Daily 
Employment Workers’ Wages Income Share 
Value-Added 
per Employee Fixed Capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
Labor Regulation[t-1] -0.006 0.016 0.032 -0.017 0.057 -9.256 0.077 -0.136 
Left [t] 0.770* 0.27 0.087 0.16 0.81 17.157 0.41 -0.78 
Labor Regulation [t-1] 
* Left [t] -4.494** -0.195 -0.307 -0.067 0.72 427.894** -3.189* 2.680* 
Observations 316 418 418 418 418 403 316 302 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.84 0.46 0.8 0.53 0.17 0.63 0.61 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors are not reported. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. Specification 
includes state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls. Estimates are significant at the 10 percent level even when excluding controls.  
 
 
 79 
 
Table 21: Robustness – Test for Outlier Left Observations: 1970-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Agricultural 
output 
Nonagricultura
l output 
Manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output  
 [1977-1997] 
Unregistered 
manufacturing 
output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employment 
Labor Regulation [t-1] 0.007 0.009 -0.009 -0.052 0.0322 0.069 -0.083 -0.077* 
Left [t] -0.711*** 0.051 -0.198 -0.4 -0.677 0.113 -0.386 -0.394 
Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] 0.129 0.221 0.052 -0.146 -1.360* 0.17 0.805** 0.748** 
Observations 415 415 415 415 307 415 442 442 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.93 0.77 0.75 0.61 0.49 0.37 0.36 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Daily 
Employment 
Workers’ 
Wages Income Share 
Value-Added 
per Employee Fixed Capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
Labor Regulation[t-1] -0.068 0.029 0.025 -0.003 0.054 -2.41 0.069 -0.165** 
Left [t] 1.232** 0.23 0.09 0.148 0.832 -13.767 0.553 -0.724 
Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] -2.061*** -0.678*** -0.002 -0.620*** 0.631 132.210* -2.640*** 3.379*** 
Observations 339 442 442 442 442 425 339 323 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.85 0.46 0.8 0.53 0.17 0.67 0.66 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors are not reported. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. All results 
include state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls. Estimates are significant at the 10 percent level even when excluding controls.  
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Table 22: Robustness – Communist Parties as an Alternate Measure for Left: 1970-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
State output Agricultural output 
Nonagricultural 
output 
Manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output 
Unregistered 
manufacturing 
output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employment 
Labor Regulation [t-1] 0.034 0.017 0.018 -0.007 -0.053 0.074 -0.052 -0.047 
Comm [t] -0.078 -0.366*** 0.014 -0.206 -0.188 0.028 -0.212 -0.168 
Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Comm [t] -0.03 0.063 -0.081* -0.098 -0.239** 0.066 -0.082 -0.092 
Observations 494 445 445 445 445 445 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.48 0.93 0.76 0.74 0.53 0.41 0.41 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Daily 
Employment 
Workers’ 
Wages Income Share 
Value-Added 
per Employee Fixed Capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
Labor Regulation[t-1] -0.118 0.003 0.028 -0.029 0.048 1.832 -0.025 -0.038 
Comm [t] 2.310*** 0.074 -0.009 0.039 -0.441 -4.409 0.976*** -1.226*** 
Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Comm [t] -1.489*** -0.059 0.063 -0.112** 0.046 -1.833 -0.754*** 0.696*** 
Observations 362 478 478 478 478 461 362 346 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.84 0.46 0.8 0.52 0.18 0.59 0.54 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors are not reported. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. All results 
include state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls. Estimates are significant at the 10 percent level even when excluding controls.  
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Table 23: Robustness – Communist Parties in the Ruling State Government as an Alternate Measure for Left: 1970-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
State output Agricultural output 
Nonagricultural 
output 
Manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output 
Unregistered 
manufacturing 
output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employment 
Labor Regulation [t-1] 0.032 0.021 0.011 -0.011 -0.061 0.072 -0.05 -0.044 
Comm Rule [t] -0.048 -0.089** -0.025 -0.015 -0.098 0.108 -0.068 -0.079 
Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Comm Rule [t] -0.017 0.015 -0.038* -0.078** -0.162*** 0.042 -0.067* -0.072** 
Observations 494 445 445 445 445 445 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.48 0.93 0.76 0.74 0.53 0.42 0.41 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Daily 
Employment 
Workers’ 
Wages Income Share 
Value-Added 
per Employee Fixed Capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
Labor Regulation[t-1] -0.220** -0.001 0.036 -0.043 0.063 3.457 -0.078 0.012 
Comm Rule [t] -0.201 -0.004 -0.035 0.043 -0.117 -7.055 -0.199 0.177 
Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Comm Rule [t] -0.580*** -0.026 0.031 -0.053** -0.015 -4.191 -0.297*** 0.242*** 
Observations 362 478 478 478 478 461 362 346 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.84 0.46 0.8 0.52 0.18 0.56 0.51 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors not reported. Output per capita is expressed in real terms. All results include 
state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls. Estimates are significant at the 10 percent level even when excluding controls.  
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Table 24: Robustness –  Alternate Specification by Lagging Left: 1970-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
State output Agricultural output 
Nonagricultural 
output 
Manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output 
Unregistered 
manufacturing 
output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employment 
0.031 0.01 0.02 -0.004 -0.049 0.077 -0.052 -0.048 Labor Regulation [t-1] (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
-0.171 -0.419*** 0.041 -0.027 -0.077 0.189 -0.206 -0.168 Left [t-1] (0.1) (0.13) (0.07) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.18) (0.17) 
-0.011 0.076 -0.075** -0.107 -0.221** 0.031 -0.065 -0.073 Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t-1] (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Observations 494 445 445 445 445 445 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.49 0.93 0.76 0.74 0.53 0.42 0.41 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Daily 
Employment 
Workers’ 
Wages Income Share 
Value-Added 
per Employee Fixed Capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
-0.08 0.007 0.027 -0.024 0.049 1.673 -0.01 -0.053 
Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (8.18) (0.1) (0.1) 
1.883*** 0.178 -0.126 0.266 0.138 20.675 0.650*** -0.810*** Left [t-1] (0.41) (0.1) (0.24) (0.26) (0.34) (41.64) (0.21) (0.2) 
-1.331*** -0.069* 0.068 -0.129** -0.014 -3.223 -0.648*** 0.601*** Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t-1] (0.17) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (12.33) (0.14) (0.14) 
Observations 362 478 478 478 478 461 362 346 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.84 0.46 0.8 0.52 0.18 0.59 0.53 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls. Standard 
errors are clustered by state and are presented in parenthesis. 
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Table 25: Economic Outcome, and Effectiveness of Labor Regulation: 1980-1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
State output Agricultural output 
Nonagricultural 
output 
Manufacturing 
output 
Registered 
manufacturing 
output 
Unregistered 
manufacturing 
output 
Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Employment 
0.029 -0.003 0.033 0.009 0.052 -0.031 -0.012 -0.015 Labor Regulation [t-1] (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) 
-0.318* -0.613*** -0.122 -0.225 -0.248 0.067 -0.25 -0.219 Left [t] (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.42) (0.47) (0.32) (0.26) (0.27) 
-0.047 0.094** -0.124*** -0.207*** -0.353*** -0.061 -0.129** -0.128** Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.1) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 336 287 287 287 287 287 336 336 
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.55 0.83 0.6 0.59 0.37 0.44 0.41 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Daily 
Employment 
Workers’ 
Wages Income Share 
Value-Added 
per Employee Fixed Capital Investment Factories 
Workers per 
Factory 
0.039 0.001 0.009 -0.004 0.026 -5.595 0.01 -0.018 
Labor Regulation[t-1] 
(0.13) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (10.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
0.526 0.138 -0.029 0.135 0.681 34.693 1.266 -1.57 Left [t] (1.25) (0.12) (0.36) (0.36) (0.48) (91.91) (1.72) (1.76) 
-1.885*** -0.060* 0.047 -0.107* 0.117 1.379 -0.784*** 0.623*** Labor Regulation [t-1] * 
Left [t] (0.22) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.14) (17.28) (0.15) (0.14) 
Observations 205 336 336 336 336 336 205 205 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.74 0.46 0.71 0.36 0.15 0.37 0.38 
* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. All results include state and time fixed effects, election dummies, and controls. Standard 
errors are clustered by state and presented in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1: Number of Person-Days Lost in Disputes: 1961-2002 
 
Source: Jha and Golder (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of Income to Workers 
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Source: Annual Survey of Industries 
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Figure 3: Share of Legislative Assembly Seats by Political Orientation and Major Party Groups: 1957-2004 
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Figure 4: Labor Regulation and Left presence in the Legislative Assemblies: 1957-2002 
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